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Copyright in Teams
Anthony J. Caseyt & Andres Sawickitt
Dozens of people worked together to produce Casablanca. But a single person
working alone wrote The Sound and the Fury. While almost all films are produced
by large collaborations, no great novel ever resulted from the work of a team. Why
does the frequency and success of collaborative creative production vary across art
forms?
The answer lies in significant part at the intersection of intellectual property
law and the theory of the firm. Existing analyses in this area often focus on patent
law and look almost exclusively to a property-rights theory of the firm. The impli-
cations of organizational theory for collaborative creativity and its intersection
with copyright law have been less examined. To fill this gap, we look to team-
production and moral-hazard theories to understand how copyright law can facili-
tate or impede collaborative creative production. While existing legal theories look
only at how creative goods are integrated with complementary assets, we explore
how the creative goods themselves are produced. This analysis sheds new light on
poorly understood features of copyright law, including the derivative-works right,
the ownership structure ofa joint work, and the work-made-for-hire doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 11, 2012, Warner Bros. announced that it was buy-
ing Alloy Entertainment.' It is rumored that Warner Bros. paid
$100 million for the purchase.2 The acquisition was not surpris-
ing. Alloy owned a massive and valuable portfolio of successful
book franchises including Gossip Girl, The Vampire Diaries, and
The Sisterhood of the Traveling Pants. Alloy and Warner had
collaborated in the past to turn those franchises into television
and film hits.3 Warner was bringing the portfolio and the pro-
duction of future franchises in house. This sort of vertical inte-
gration-the acquisition of an upstream input producer-has
been explored extensively in law and in economics.4 The terrain
1 See TimeWarner, Warner Bros. Television Group Signs Deal to Acquire Alloy En-
tertainment from ZelnickMedia, online at http://www.timewarner.com/newsroom/press
-releases/2012/06/WarnerBros_TelevisionGroup-SignsDeal-toAcquire_06-11-2012
(visited Nov 24, 2013).
2 See Christopher S. Stewart, Corporate Watch, Wall St J B5 (June 12, 2012) ("The
terms of the deal weren't disclosed, but a person familiar with the matter said that the
price was $100 million.").
3 TimeWarner, Warner Bros. Television Group Signs Deal to Acquire Alloy Enter-
tainment from ZelnickMedia (cited in note 1).
4 See generally, for example, Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A.
Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Pro-
cess, 21 J L & Econ 297 (1978); Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J Polit Econ 691
(1986).
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of the upstream input producer itself-the factors that deter-
mine the existence, organization, and success of firms like Alloy
in the first place-has been left relatively untouched. This Arti-
cle maps that territory.
Alloy owns these various book franchises because it wrote
the books. The key word is "it." Alloy is a firm that makes novels
the way a mining firm makes coal. For every input into a final
product, a firm must answer the classic Coasean "make or buy"
question. Traditional publishers buy their creative inputs from
independent authors. Alloy, on the other hand, opted to make its
own creativity.
And Alloy is not alone. The "firm as author" industry-
sometimes referred to as "book packaging" or more favorably as
"literary incubating"-has been quietly growing over the last
three decades.6 Though these firms give a lead writer credit for
the novel (often under a pseudonym), the writing process unfolds
under an internal nonmarket hierarchy.6 The firm owns the cop-
yright and negotiates with publishers as an individual author
normally would.7
This collaborative production of books might be analogized
to the production of movies, television shows, or various other
creative products that are the fruits of team effort. The organi-
zation of creative collaborative processes into firms is pervasive.
But the law's impact on these organizations remains relatively
unexamined.9 In this Article, we explore theories of organizing
5 Book packaging is said to have begun with the Stratemeyer Syndicate, which put
out the Nancy Drew and The Hardy Boys series. See Rebecca Mead, The Gossip Mill, The
New Yorker 62 (Oct 19, 2009). In the late 1980s, 17th Street Productions was founded as
a packager and produced a hit in the Sweet Valley High series. From there its success
grew and it was purchased by Alloy Entertainment in 2000. See Motoko Rich and Dinitia
Smith, First, Idea, Plot and Characters. Then, a Book Needs an Author, NY Times Al
(Apr 27, 2006).
6 See Interview with Lexa Hillyer, cofounder of Paper Lantern Lit (Oct 28, 2011)
("Hillyer Interview") (on file with authors); Rich and Smith, First, Idea, Plot and Charac-
ters, NY Times at Al (cited in note 5) (quoting an interview with Cindy Egan, who stat-
ed: "[I]t's kind of like working on a television show. We all work together in shaping each
novel."); Mead, The Gossip Mill, The New Yorker at 62 (cited in note 5) (noting that the
"author" of Gossip Girl was "an old hand at the writing-by-committee method").
7 See Hillyer Interview (cited in note 6).
8 See Rich and Smith, First, Idea, Plot and Characters, NY Times at Al (cited in
note 5) (quoting an interview with Cindy Egan).
9 In economics there has been more analysis of this type of organization. See, for
example, Richard E. Caves, Creative Industries: Contracts between Art and Commerce 1-
20 (Harvard 2000); Ricard Gil and Pablo T. Spiller, The Organizational Implications of
Creativity: The US Film Industry in Mid-XXth Century *2-4 (NBER Working Paper No
13253, July 2007), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3253 (visited Nov 24, 2013).
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collaborative creative production in a firm and address their le-
gal implications.o We look to team-production and moral-hazard
theories to explain how the collaborative production of creative
goods is organized, not only in firms like Alloy, but throughout
various creative industries. We then develop new legal theories
to explain the interaction between copyright law and collabora-
tive creative production.
In doing so, we identify a gap in the normative analysis of
intellectual property law. The primary debate in intellectual
property has been about ownership, access, and incentives to
produce." What has been absent, though, is an analysis of the
way that the law affects collaborative creation. To be sure, some
have explored whether copyright law favors corporate ownership
of rights and whether that ownership facilitates the investments
necessary to exploit creative works.12 But that is a quite different
question from whether copyright law facilitates the production
of creative goods in firms and in teams.13
The theories of organizational hierarchies that we examine
demonstrate how the law can facilitate or obstruct collaboration
among creative inputs. And because collaborative creation is dif-
ferent in kind from noncollaborative creation, the law will im-
pact the mix of creative products that are available. This mech-
anism for the law's impact on the content of our culture has been
previously unexplored. With that insight, we then demonstrate
the predictive and explanatory promise of these theories by ex-
ploring the implications for copyright law.
1o Throughout this article we refer to production of creative goods. Defining "crea-
tivity" can be difficult. Professors Gil and Spiller adopt the Encyclopedia Britannica's
definition in their analysis of creative organization. See Gil and Spiller, Organizational
Implications of Creativity at *2 (cited in note 9), quoting 3 New Encyclopedia Britannica
721 (15th ed 2007) ("Creativity: the ability to make or otherwise bring into existence
something new, whether a new solution to a problem, a new method or device, or a new
artistic object or form."). See also Mark A. Runco and Garrett J. Jaeger, The Standard
Definition of Creativity, 24 Creativity Rsrch J 92, 92 (2012) ("Creativity requires both
originality and effectiveness."); Caves, Creative Industries at 2-10 (cited in note 9). We
do the same. Most of this Article focuses on the creativity in new artistic objects or forms
such as movies, books, and music. But the general analysis applies more broadly.
11 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 Va L
Rev 1745, 1750-52 (2012).
12 See generally Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-industrial Econ-
omy: A Research Agenda, 2011 Wis L Rev 141.
13 Indeed, in some cases, laws that simply favor corporate ownership of rights may
in fact drive creative production out of firms and into the market. A creator who opposes
default ownership by a firm she associates with may never associate with the firm in the
first place.
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We proceed in two parts. Part I of this Article explores theo-
ries of the organization of creative production. Legal scholars
who have analyzed how firms and markets produce things cov-
ered by the label "intellectual property" have almost universally
applied a property-rights theory of the firm.14 That theory relies
on allocation of residual-control rights-that is, the right to de-
cide what to do with an asset in the event of a disagreement-to
solve holdup problems. The property-rights theory is limited in
explaining the organization of large swaths of creative produc-
tion. Collaborative creative inputs are often a form of human
capital that cannot be integrated in the property-rights sense of
obtaining rights of residual control.16 Nonetheless, we do see or-
ganizations of these creative inputs that look like firms, as the
term is understood by many of the theorists of the firm, includ-
ing Professors Ronald Coase, Armen A. Alchian, Harold Dem-
setz, and Oliver E. Williamson.16 For example, movies are made
14 For the foundations of the property-rights theory, see Oliver Hart and John
Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J Polit Econ 1119, 1125-49
(1990); Grossman and Hart, 94 J Polit Econ at 697-716 (cited in note 4). See also
Philippe Aghion and Richard Holden, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm:
What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?, 25 J Econ Persp 181, 183 (Spring 2011).
Professor Robert Merges pioneered the application of the property-rights theory to intel-
lectual property law. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights, Input Markets,
and the Value of Intangible Assets *5 (unpublished draft, Feb 9, 1999), online at
http://www.law.berkeley.edulfiles/iprights.pdf (visited Nov 24, 2013). See also generally
Ashish Arora and Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and
Firm Boundaries, 13 Industrial & Corp Change 451 (2004). For subsequent work in this
area, see generally Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of
Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U Pa L Rev 1649 (2009); Dan L. Burk and Brett H.
McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the
Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U Ill L Rev 575 (combining a property-rights theory with a
Coasean transaction-costs theory of the firm); Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property
as a Law of Organization, 84 S Cal L Rev 785 (2011); Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property
and the Firm, 71 U Chi L Rev 3 (2004); Erica Gorga and Michael Halberstam, Knowledge
Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the
Firm, 101 Nw U L Rev 1123 (2007).
15 By focusing on residual control, holdup, and property rights, the literature ig-
nores the nonmarket organization of inputs in which property rights do not (and cannot)
exist. This is not a novel critique of the property-rights theory. It is a recurrent point of
analysis in the economic literature on firms. The point, however, has not been fully ex-
plored in the context of firms and intellectual property law, where it is of central
importance.
16 There is always some unavoidable communicative disjunction in discussing
"firms." Many of the differences in theoretical analyses turn on a disagreement in defin-
ing the underlying term. Our project is not defining the "firm," but rather studying law's
impact on the organization of creative collaboration. In this paper we use the terms
"managerial hierarchy" and "firm" in the Coasean sense to denote an organizational
structure where a manager is commanding production. It is unimportant that that rela-
tionship may nominally be created by a long-term contract. The outcome is the same,
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by hierarchies with a director or producer who allocates and re-
allocates human resources without resort to a market. Orches-
tras respond to the instructions of a conductor. Similarly, there
is an emerging market for novels written by firms, rather than
by independent authors. Our aim is to understand why these or-
ganizations arise and how the law affects their viability.
Part I applies theories of teams and moral hazard to demon-
strate that these firms have emerged not to reduce holdup but to
capture the value of collaborative creation that is facilitated by
team production in a managed hierarchy. Indeed, the threat of
holdup on the other side of the equation may often push against
integration.
Part II explores the implications of this analysis for copy-
right law. We first note the ways in which existing law facili-
tates or impedes collaborative creative production. We then
identify the ways in which the law might be modified so as to
minimize the barriers it currently poses to the use of these or-
ganizational forms.17 Our analysis produces predictions that are
distinct from those in the existing literature.
Our focus is on the definition and ownership structure of
joint works, the work-made-for-hire provision, and the deriva-
tive-works right. The joint-works doctrine identifies collabora-
tive creative production that would be optimally produced in hi-
erarchical firms. But the default ownership structure for joint
works impedes the formation of such firms. By conflating owner-
ship with authorship and control, the rule undermines the value
and incentives of a hierarchical manager and encourages minor
contributors in a collaborative production to seek rewards be-
yond the value of their contributions (often by unnecessary ac-
tions to create the appearance of input or control).
Disentangling ownership of joint works from authorship and
control of production creates an opportunity for altering copyright's
and the difference is semantic. Importantly, we are distinguishing hierarchical produc-
tion from outright market purchase that occurs after a good is produced. There are, of
course, grey areas between those extremes.
17 We do not argue here that the law should necessarily be changed in these ways.
There may be reasons why copyright law in particular or intellectual property law more
generally may favor individualized production-perhaps the world has too many creative
people working in teams to produce Hollywood movies and too few working alone to
write novels. For now, though, our aim is to isolate copyright's effects on team produc-
tion. We take as given that copyright law should make it easier for creative inputs to col-
laborate, and we identify how copyright law may do so. If it turns out that team produc-
tion is normatively undesirable, then the shapers of the law should simply do the
opposite of what we suggest.
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rules to foster the organization of creative collaboration. Specifi-
cally, the work-made-for-hire doctrine, as it is applied by courts
in the context of creative collaborations, is backwards. While the
default ownership structure for a work made for hire is amena-
ble to collaborative creativity, courts do not consider factors rel-
evant to optimal creative organization when deciding whether a
given relationship falls within the scope of that doctrine. The
work-made-for-hire doctrine is in fact often applied precisely
when the benefits of hierarchical management for creative col-
laborations are low.
These observations about joint works and works made for
hire suggest valuable modifications to the doctrines. Specifically,
applying the work-made-for-hire doctrine as the default rule for
truly joint works and otherwise focusing on a new set of factors
to identify works made for hire will better align intellectual
property rights with an optimal organization for collaborative
creativity.
We also propose a new theory to explain the derivative-
works doctrine. The ability to allocate rights in derivative works
improves incentives to collaborate and reduces the costs of con-
tracting for the team production of the original product in a way
that allocation of rights in the original collaborative product
cannot. This improves the ability of parties to contract for the
original production and allows collaborative firms to integrate
creative inputs. The stronger the derivative-works right,18 the
cheaper the ex ante allocation of control rights in both the deriv-
ative and original product, and the more attractive the firm is
relative to the market. Thus, where collaborative creativity is
important, strong derivative-works rights foster potentially val-
uable integration. This would also suggest that, where collabo-
ration is less important, derivative-works rights are inefficient
or irrelevant. This analysis suggests new ways that the rules of
18 A strong version of the derivative-works right would give the copyright holder
control over a broad range of follow-on work; a weak version would give very little
control.
19 This is in contrast to the existing theories of intellectual property and the firm
that suggest that strong property rights will lead to smaller firms. See note 14. Profes-
sors Dan L. Burk and Brett H. McDonnell have a more nuanced view suggesting that
integration increases with either overly strong or overly weak property rights. In their
view the optimal property rights lead to a minimal level of integration (all else equal).
See Burk and McDonnell, 2007 U Ill L Rev at 626-33 (cited in note 14). Again our con-
clusion for derivative-works rights is in contrast: the optimal property rights may often
lead to an expansion in the size of the firm because the firm fosters optimal collaboration.
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intellectual property can impact the nature of society's creative
output.
I. A THEORY OF CREATIVE PRODUCTION
The existing literature on intellectual property and the firm
has provided insight into how and why already-produced crea-
tive goods or modular units of creative production are integrated
with other complementary assets.20 In contrast, in this Part, we
explore how the production of the creative good itself is orga-
nized, and why it is organized that way. Property-rights theory
cannot answer those questions. But there are other theories of
the firm, and the hierarchical creative-production teams we ex-
amine would all be considered firms under the economic theories
of Professors Coase,21 Williamson,22 Alchian and Demsetz,23 and
Holmstr6m,24 and in colloquial and legal parlance.
In this Part, we (a) explore the limitations of property
rights-theory, (b) show the value of team-production theories,
and (c) apply that analysis to creative production.
A. The Limitations of Property-Rights Theory
In its simplest form, property-rights theory defines a firm as
the collection of nonhuman assets that are commonly owned.25
Integration occurs when two assets come under the same owner-
ship. Ownership is defined as residual control. Residual control
refers to the right to control all uses of the relevant asset.
Property-rights theory identifies common ownership as a
partial solution to problems that arise when managers of assets
must make relationship-specific investments. Imagine that asset
A (managed by manager A) can be combined with asset B (man-
aged by manager B) to create value. The combination of the two
assets requires investments that are only valuable when the as-
sets are combined. Once those relationship-specific investments
20 See note 14.
21 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 389 (1937).
22 See Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure
Considerations, 61 Am Econ Rev 112, 113-14 (1971).
23 See Armen A. Aichian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 Am Econ Rev 777, 785-95 (1972).
24 See Bengt Holmstr6m, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 Bell J Econ 324, 338-39
(1982).
25 See Bengt Holmstrom and John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited,
12 J Econ Persp 73, 77 (Fall 1998).
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are made,26 the assets are worth more together than they are in
any other use. This allows one manager to threaten to withdraw
opportunistically to appropriate value from the other. Anticipat-
ing this outcome, parties will not make optimal relationship-
specific investments in the first place.27
Assuming that the parties cannot effectively contract to
avoid this opportunistic holdup,28 integration provides a partial
solution. If manager A owns both assets A and B, she has resid-
ual control over the future allocation of the productive use of
those assets. Because this ownership structure reduces manager
B's withdrawal threat and corresponding ability to engage in
opportunistic holdup, manager A will make closer-to-optimal re-
lationship-specific investments. This is only a partial solution to
suboptimal relationship-specific investment because manager B
is still subject to manager A's withdrawal threat and may there-
fore still underinvest. Thus, we expect integration in favor of
ownership by the manager whose investment decisions are more
important to the value of the enterprise.29
Those who have analyzed intellectual property laws through
the property-rights lens have identified the disclosure paradox
as a main source of potential holdup.3o Specifically, buyers of in-
formational goods require disclosure before purchase so that
they can value the things they are buying.3' But in the absence
of intellectual property rights, once the information is disclosed
its value can be appropriated without purchase.32 Contracting
solutions such as confidentiality agreements can be difficult to
enforce and are often incomplete.33 Thus, the recipient of disclosure
26 These relationship-specific investments can be in specializing assets to work to-
gether or training human capital-like the manager's expertise-to use the assets.
27 Not all withdrawal threats are bad. In some cases, when they are state contin-
gent, withdrawal rights can be valuable substitutes for monitoring. See, for example,
Douglas G. Baird and Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of
Corporate Reorganizations, 113 Colum L Rev 1, 8-9 (2013).
28 Incomplete contracting is at the heart of property-rights theory and is well ex-
plored in the literature.
29 See note 14.
30 See, for example, Burk and McDonnell, 2007 U Ill L Rev at 584-85 (cited in note
14); Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky, 157 U Pa L Rev at 1653-54 (cited in note 14).
31 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for In-
vention, in National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity: Economic and Social Factors 609, 615 (UMI 1962).
32 See id.
33 See Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 Berkeley Tech
L J 1477, 1497-98 (2005) (concluding that nondisclosure agreements "involve nontrivial
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can withdraw from the relationship having appropriated valua-
ble information. This is an incurable holdup threat.3< Anticipat-
ing that holdup risk, sellers will suboptimally invest in develop-
ing the goods and not make any disclosure. The converse is also
a holdup problem. If the buyer pays before disclosure, she has no
way to verify that she is getting the valuable information she
bargained for.36 Anticipating this, the buyer will either demand
disclosure before payment or not enter the market in the first
place.
The property-rights model suggests this holdup risk can be
reduced by vertical integration. When intellectual property
rights are weak, buyers and sellers therefore integrate in order
to reduce that risk. When intellectual property rights are strong,
enforceable property rights substitute for integration as a solu-
tion to the holdup threat; that is, intellectual property rights are
designed to solve the disclosure paradox36 The seller need not
fear that disclosure will lead to misappropriation because a valid
patent allows the seller to sue to stop the buyer's unauthorized
use of the information.3? With strong intellectual property rights,
sellers face smaller holdup risks and are therefore less likely to
integrate with buyers.38
It is worth pausing to note that the application of property-
rights theory to intellectual property law focuses on the integra-
tion of assets that are complementary to the creative good19 It
does not describe the integration of multiple inputs to the crea-
tive good itself. Consider a lab where inventions are developed
and a factory where they are used in production. The property-
rights integration question is whether the factory will integrate
with the lab: Will the factory owner buy the lab, the lab owner
buy the factory, or neither? But the property-rights analysis
tells us nothing about the organization of the collaborative
problems of proof' and that "[m]ost business people ... know that even with a signed
NDA, precontractual disclosures can be risky for the disclosing party").
34 See id.
35 And pricing the transaction is almost impossible. See id at 1480 (noting the diffi-
culty in pricing a transaction where the rights are not known prior to the exchange);
R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J L & Econ 1, 14 (1959).
36 See Arrow, Economic Welfare at 616-17 (cited in note 31).
37 See 35 USC § 271.
38 See Barnett, 84 S Cal L Rev at 808-11 (cited in note 14); Merges, Intellectual
Property Rights at *17-19 (cited in note 14).
39 For work on the integration of complementary assets with creative inputs, see
generally Caves, Creative Industries (cited in note 9).
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production of the creative good itself. It does not answer the
question of how the scientists working in the lab are organized.
A property-rights firm can arise only when ex ante alloca-
tion of ex post residual-control rights is possible.40 The residual-
control rights must be allocated before the parties make rela-
tionship-specific investments; otherwise, the firm cannot help
solve the ex post holdup problem created by the relationship-
specific investments. For the initial creative production, howev-
er, that ex ante allocation is not possible. Residual rights in the
creative function of the mind cannot be transferred or integrated
in the property-rights sense.4' But the production of intellectual
property, almost by definition, always has at least one input
that is a product of the mind.42 Holdup threats, therefore, can be
reduced and controlled (if at all) only by contract or informal
mechanisms like reputation.43 For high-creativity intellectual
production, parties cannot effectively commit in advance to any
given allocation of ex post residual-control rights; neither prop-
erty nor contractual mechanisms can effectively reduce the abil-
ity of the creative party to engage in opportunistic behavior by,
for example, concealing the best high-creativity input and apply-
ing it to another use.44 Thus, there is a fundamental problem of
moral hazard. And it is a problem that prevents both complete
contracting and integration (in the residual-control sense).
But even though integration cannot cure holdup in these
scenarios, we do see firms. Creative inputs are controlled within
40 See Merges, Intellectual Property Rights at *8-11 (cited in note 14).
41 See Robert Gibbons, Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?, 58 J Econ Beh &
Org 200, 205 (2005) (noting that the inalienability of control rights over human capital
reduces the degree to which integration can reduce holdup and rent seeking: "inalienable
control rights are staying put, by definition"); Holmstrom and Roberts, 12 J Econ Persp
at 79 (cited in note 25) ("If, on the other hand, firms consist of more than one individual,
then one has to ask how one should interpret the unobserved investments (in human
capital) that cannot be transferred. . . . At present, the property-rights models are so
stylized that they cannot answer these questions."). In Professor Coase's view, holdup
and rent-seeking problems are not problems that integration is uniquely situated to ad-
dress. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, 4 J L, Econ, & Org 33, 43 (1988).
See also Coase, 4 Economica at 398-401 (cited in note 21).
42 See, for example, Gil and Spiller, Organizational Implications of Creativity at *2
(cited in note 9) (noting that creativity is an input over which there is often neither
command and control nor an ability to incentivize with money: "High level creativity, in
short, can only be fostered, it cannot be commanded").
43 Indeed, integration in these circumstances often increases rather than decreases
holdup. See id at *5 ("[I]nternal production is subject to a serious hold-up hazard based
upon the inherent informational asymmetry.").
44 See id (discussing the problem of concealing better ideas). See also Holmstrom
and Roberts, 12 J Econ Persp at 75-79 (cited in note 25).
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hierarchies. That control is achieved by contract, not by property
ownership. Unlike the classic example of a coal mine owned by A
and a power plant owned by B, where B has an idea in her head,
there is no way for A to purchase the residual-control rights to
that idea. If there are no complementary real assets, A can only
try to bind or encourage B to produce the idea by contract. In
some cases even that may be impossible. But where it is possible
we often see employment contracts used to create hierarchical
teams to produce these creative goods at the direction of a man-
ager-that is to say, we see Coasean firms.46 This is not to sug-
gest that the property-rights theory has no place in this analy-
sis. To the contrary, much of the production utilizing intellectual
products is best analyzed through the property-rights lens. But
the property-rights lens does not clarify the production of the
creative good itself.
To use our opening example, the property-rights theory goes
a long way to explain Warner's acquisition of Alloy, but not Al-
loy's own organization. This lack of an explanatory theory leaves
several legal questions unexplored. For example, should Alloy
alone own the copyright in the books it produces? Or should each
author in the firm own an undivided share in the copyright?
Who should have the right to produce works based on the origi-
nal? To answer these types of questions, we must explore the
creative production function at the heart of firms like Alloy.
B. Theories of Team Production
Postinvestment opportunistic holdup is not the only cost of
collaborative production. Other forms of information asymmetry
cause moral-hazard problems. Specifically, when (1) investment
inputs are difficult to observe and (2) final output cannot be al-
located to specific inputs, the input providers will have incen-
tives to shirk or otherwise undersupply their inputs.46 Because
effort cannot be observed and output cannot be allocated, the in-
put providers will share equally in the final output regardless of
effort. This creates a classic free-rider problem. This differs from
property-rights holdup and rent-seeking problems that the existing
45 Professor Coase viewed the firm not as ownership of residual control but rather
as an organization where an entrepreneur (rather than the market) allocated resources.
See Coase, 4 Economica at 389 (cited in note 21).
46 See Gil and Spiller, Organizational Implications of Creativity at *4-5 (cited in
note 9) (discussing the problem of concealing better ideas). See also Holmstrom and Rob-
erts, 12 J Econ Persp at 75-79 (cited in note 25).
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literature suggests firms are solving. In a pure rent-seeking the-
ory, the costs arise from ex post haggling. In the property-rights
analysis, the costs are incurred when parties ex ante underin-
vest in relationship-specific assets in anticipation of the ex post
holdup. The team-production and moral-hazard theories require
no ex ante investment decision and no ex post haggling. Rather,
the costs arise because the input providers supply suboptimal
collaborative effort.
This type of moral hazard is particularly problematic for
team production where human-capital inputs are central to out-
put. For simplicity, we will proceed with an example of produc-
tion that uses only human-capital inputs. The property-rights
theorists view the problems of this production as problems that
are uniquely issues of market transactions.47 The team-
production theorists take a different view. The main theories
suggest two potential ways that organization in a firm or hierar-
chy can solve this problem. The first is monitoring. The second is
enforcement of ex post rewards and penalties.48
1. The monitoring manager.
Team production can provide a valuable monitoring mecha-
nism when inputs are at least partially observable but not veri-
fiable and not easily allocated to output. The classic example is
two laborers jointly moving a box. Ex post, the specific effort of
each individual laborer is difficult to verify and allocate. We can
measure the movement of boxes. But that provides little infor-
mation on the effort of each laborer.
A team leader (which will be a firm's manager) observing in
real time can use imperfect signals to monitor and meter effort.49
This is where hierarchical organization adds value. The manag-
er can see how much each worker is sweating, how long her
breaks are, and how quickly she moves to the next box. Another
example can be found in sports. A basketball coach can observe
47 Consider Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 21 J L & Econ 297 (cited in note 4) ("The
previous analysis has dealt with examples of physical capital. When specific human capi-
tal is involved, the opportunism problem is often more complex and, because of laws pro-
hibiting slavery, the solution is generally some form of explicit or implicit contract rather
than vertical integration.").
8 See Alchian and Demsetz, 62 Am Econ Rev at 778-81 (cited in note 23). Profes-
sor Holmstrom is skeptical of the monitoring role of the team leader and instead focuses
on the reward and penalty role to reduce moral hazard. See Holmstrom, 13 Bell J Econ
at 325-26 (cited in note 24). We suggest that both factors are playing a role.
9 See Alchian and Demsetz, 62 Am Econ Rev at 781-85 (cited in note 23).
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the player's position, how fast she is running, and how high she
is jumping. Based on these observations, the coach or manager
can reward, penalize, or replace the player during the production.50
In this way, the team facilitates monitoring, quick adjust-
ment of incentives, and reallocation of resources. The manager
observes the clues to effort level and adjusts the organization of
production accordingly. The manager serves as a hub for the
various contractual relationships that go into a team production.
The manager has contracts with each of the various input sup-
pliers. Those contracts or relationships can be altered through
bilateral negotiation between the manager and the single input
provider. No multilateral relationship need exist between the
separate input providers. The basketball players do not negoti-
ate with each other about who will play point guard for the sec-
ond half.
The manager will have the incentive to perform this moni-
toring by virtue of a grant of residual profit. Thus, it is critical to
the success of this organization that the manager be the residual
claimant, be able to observe (even if imperfectly) input behavior,
and be the central party to input contracts.8 '
The value of this arrangement decreases as observability
decreases. If there are no signals for the manager to observe or if
the signals are poorly correlated with the underlying variable of
interest, the manager's monitoring adds little value.
2. The enforcement manager.
Even without observability, organizing production in a firm
can be valuable. Firms serve a second function even when inputs
are both unobservable and unverifiable. Namely, a manager can
enforce reward and penalty mechanisms that substitute for
monitoring and provide incentives for optimal effort even where
that effort cannot be known.52 Thus, while two workers in a con-
tractual relationship with each other will shirk, the manager's
oversight reduces that moral hazard.
50 See id. See also Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J L
& Econ 1, 8 (1983) (noting an example in pre-Communist China where riverboat workers
"agreed to the hiring of a monitor to whip them").
s1 See Alchian and Demsetz, 62 Am Econ Rev at 781-83 (cited in note 23).
52 See Holmstr6m, 13 Bell J Econ at 326-30 (cited in note 24). For a theory of how
to achieve appropriate incentives for the manager, see Sandeep Baliga and Tomas
Sjostrom, Contracting with Third Parties, 1 Am Econ J: Microecon 75, 92-98 (Feb 2009);
Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q J Econ
387, 391-424 (1998).
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The penalty-reward function of the manager is somewhat
analogous to proposals of government prizes in place of intellec-
tual property rights. In that literature, some have suggested
that a prize system would be preferable to property rights in en-
couraging creativity.5> Here the point is more positive than nor-
mative: where property (and contract) rights are too weak to fos-
ter creativity, prizes will be an alternative mechanism. The fact
that the prizes are provided by a firm rather than the govern-
ment doesn't change the analysis. As noted below, both govern-
ment- and firm-issued prizes might be at work. The government
might give a prize to the firm for its development, and the firm
would then allocate the benefits of those rights as prizes to the
team members. The derivative-works right might be playing this
role.54
To illustrate in a simplified form, consider a production
method where output (y) is a function of two human-capital in-
puts (Xi and X2). The value of the output is not the sum of the
value of separable inputs. Optimally-and to make the collabo-
rative production worthwhile-that output will also be greater
than the sum of the inputs. The inputs are unobservable and
unverifiable. Thus
(1) y = f(Xl,X2)
and
(2) f(X,X2) > X, + X2 (this is a distinctive characteristic of a
valuable collaborative production)55
and
53 See Saul Levmore, A Public Choice View of IP(rizes) *6 (RSCAS Policy Paper,
2012), online at http://cadmus.eui.eulbitstream/handle/1814/23982/RSCASPP_2012
10.pdf?sequence=1 (visited Nov 24, 2013).
54 See notes 155-63 and accompanying text. It may seem odd to refer to a deriva-
tive-works right as a prize rather than a property right. It is both: it is a prize that takes
the form of property right. But the key is that it is a right in a future product rather than
a right in the existing product. It is not a property right in the initial product; it is a
prize that is granted for the development of the initial product. You could imagine a sys-
tem of copyright that gave the creator no property right in the initial creation but exclu-
sive rights to develop derivative works.
55 Strictly speaking, the condition for collaborative production is that f(X,,X2) is not
the sum of Xi + X2. Out of equilibrium, where parties are shirking f(Xi,X 2) may be less
than X, + X2.
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(3) X and X2 cannot be observed
and
(4) no portion of y can be allocated specifically to Xi or X2.56
Because the inputs cannot be observed or verified, each input
provider has an incentive to shirk. For example,
X = 3 or 1
and
X2 = 3 or 1
if (X,X 2) = (3,3) then y = 7
if (Xi,X2) = (3,1) or (1,3) then y = 4
if (XL,X 2) = (1,1) then y = 2.
This results in a free-rider problem. If both Xi and X2 per-
form, they split 7 for a surplus of 1. Thus if they share payouts
evenly, each gets a surplus of 0.5. If one fully performs and the
other shirks, they split 4 for a total surplus of 0. If they share
payouts equally, the full performer gets a surplus of -1 and the
shirker gets a surplus of 1. If neither fully performs, they split 2
for a surplus of 0. Here, equal payouts result in each producer
getting a surplus of 0. Neither input can know whether the other
input will fully perform. In equilibrium, both will shirk.
To solve this 'problem, they might enter an agreement in
which each will pay a penalty slightly greater than .5 if the out-
put is less than 7. The penalty would be paid to an outsider or
could simply be the destruction of the value.57 If this penalty is
56 In some sense, the inability to allocate is a combination of unobservability and
unverifiability.
57 Because it is a penalty on the entire team, it cannot be traded among the input
providers. That means that the team members must agree to either give money away or
destroy it (that is, burn the money). An agreement to burn money will, of course, be diffi-
cult to enforce in a world where renegotiation is possible. The only way to make the pen-
alty binding is to enlist a third-party enforcer or create a mechanism that automatically
destroys the value.
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enforced, they will both have the incentive to perform68 even if
no one could ever identify which individual was shirking.69 This
reduces the moral hazard and shirking that arise when the con-
nection between inputs and outputs cannot be directly observed.
But this penalty cannot be enforced by contract between the in-
put providers. Because each party is worse off if she pays the
penalty than if she does not, the parties will simply renegotiate
rather than pay the penalty.60 Ex post, the parties will mutually
agree not to pay the penalty.61
The renegotiation problem can be solved where there is a
manager who is entitled to the payment of the penalty. The
manager serves the role of enforcing the penalty agreement. As
should be evident, the manager must not be the provider of the
inputs.62
3. Solving team-production problems.
By combining these two concepts (monitoring and enforcing
penalties), a managed hierarchy can solve several problems that
pervade team production (especially creative team production).
58 In game theory terms, this penalty has transformed a prisoner's-dilemma prob-
lem into a stag-hunt problem. In pure theory, even with the penalty the stag-hunt prob-
lem has two equilibria: both perform or both shirk. But conditional upon entering the
agreement in the first place, each party is likely to expect the other to perform since that
is the only way to make the relationship valuable. In other words the "best" option of
both performing creates a Schelling focal point. See generally Thomas C. Schelling, The
Strategy of Conflict (Harvard 1981).
59 See Holmstrom, 13 Bell J Econ at 326-30 (cited in note 24).
60 The ability to renegotiate contracts is central to the holdup problem. For a dis-
cussion on the value of renegotiation-proof contracts (and how they might be achieved),
see Richard Holden and Anup Malani, Contracts versus Assets and the Boundary of the
Firm *16-17 (working paper, Jan 5, 2012), online at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1990550 (visited Nov 24, 2013).
61 For now we assume a one-time transaction rather than repeat play. Repeat play
adds reputation mechanisms and the possibility of punishing and rewarding a party with
the rights of future participation. See notes 66-67.
62 See Rajan and Zingales, 113 Q J Econ at 389-91 (cited in note 52); Holmstrim,
13 Bell J Econ at 327-28 (cited in note 24):
The enforcement problem can be overcome only by bringing in a principal (or a
party) who will assume the residual of the nonbudget balancing sharing rules.
The principal will not renegotiate the contract if for some reason the proper
level of output is not attained. Note that it is important that the principal not
provide any (unobservable) productive inputs or else a free-rider problem re-
mains.
For a theory of how to achieve appropriate incentives for the manager, see Baliga and
Sj6str6m, 1 Am Econ J: Microecon at 93-98 (cited in note 52).
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The literature identifies four factors that influence collaborative
production:
(a) Observability: the ability to observe input effort as it is
provided63
(b) Verifiability: the ability to verify the input effort to out-
siders64
(c) Allocation of input to output: the ability to assign output
value to specific inputs65
(d) Certainty: the ability to know ex ante the likely value of
a potential output that can be produced with a certain
level of inputs6
As any of these is factors is reduced, collaborative production be-
comes more challenging. In the extreme, when none of these is
present, no firm (and no contract) can be created.67
If effort is completely observable, verifiable, and allocable,
then a contract (perhaps a partnership arrangement) will be suf-
ficient. But in true collaborative production, perfect allocation
will rarely be possible. For our analysis here, we assume that al-
location is always imperfect for creative team production.
If effort is completely verifiable (but not allocable) there
might arise an independent-contractor relationship where one
party hires another and pays her per effort. This is also unlikely
to be the case for creative production because of the problems of
observing and verifying mental effort.68
63 Observability is often limited in creative production because of the informational
asymmetry between manager and input provider. See Gil and Spiller, Organizational
Implications of Creativity at *3-4 (cited in note 9).
64 Something could be observable by the parties but not verifiable ex post. With in-
formation asymmetry often comes both observation and verification problems. The moni-
tor and the third party will find it difficult to know (observe) or prove (verify) the level of
input effort. For example, a video game programmer who promised to give his best idea
may then disclose her second-best idea instead. Id at *5. A director, though, may know
that an actor has not devoted enough time to studying the script, even if it would be im-
possible to prove in court that the actor was inadequately prepared.
65 Collaborative production will often by nature lead to problems with allocation.
The inability to observe and verify will also often be the cause of an inability to allocate.
66 Certainty is often limited for creative production because the product is by defi-
nition new. Thus, ex ante, there is an "infinite variety" of outputs and "nobody knows"
exactly what the optimal output will be. Id at *3. See also Caves, Creative Industries at
6-7 (cited in note 9).
67 There may be substitutes such as reputation or repeated play that fill in for con-
ditions (a), (b), or (d).
68 See Gil and Spiller, Organizational Implications of Creativity at *3 (cited in note 9).
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If output is completely allocable but input is not observable,
there might arise a contractual relationship with ex post bonus-
es based on the allocated output.
The interesting case for us then is where allocation and veri-
fiability are impossible69 and observability and certainty are im-
perfect at varying degrees.
Where there is some certainty but no observability, the
team must function through penalties and rewards implemented
by a manager who owns the residual claim and does not herself
provide nonseparable inputs. Thus, in the box example, if effort
is unobservable but it is known that five boxes will be moved in
an hour if both workers fully perform, the manager need only
impose a penalty on both workers if less than five boxes are
moved in an hour (or a reward if five are moved).
As observability increases, the role of the manager as a
monitor becomes more valuable. Thus, the manager need not
impose ex post penalties or rewards but simply observe and pun-
ish lack of effort during the production process. In the next Sec-
tion we show how the manager's role impacts the organization of
creative production.
C. Creative Team Production
To demonstrate the usefulness of team production in ex-
plaining the organization of creative production, we focus on a
production function where two (or more) creative inputs can be
combined into a single creative output.
The two inputs create unique value only when collaborative-
ly combined with the other. That is, they produce an output that
is greater than the sum of their separate values (equations (1)
and (2) above). Because all the inputs are creative, the value of
the output of this creative-production process depends entirely
on creative elements.
In many cases this will mean observability and verifiability
(factors (a) and (b) above) are absent. The creative input is a
product of human effort. But that effort is often difficult to ob-
serve, difficult to verify, and even difficult to allocate to precise
amounts of output. As noted above, that creates moral hazard.
Moreover, uncertainty will often be high for novel intellectual
products. At the extreme, when the product is entirely creative,
all four factors will be absent. With unobservable, unverifiable
69 Impossible is an extreme assumption for simplicity.
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inputs unallocable to uncertain outcomes, no collaboration is
possible. Thus, all else equal, the highest-creativity productions
will tend to be done by individuals outside of firms and outside
of teams. Of course all else is not equal. Certain creative produc-
tions will be impossible without collaboration. Thus, for exam-
ple, we do not suggest that the most creative movies can or will
be made by one individual with no assistance. The point is ra-
ther that the more creative a project (and holding all other con-
siderations constant), the more costly collaboration will be.
Sometimes those costs will make collaboration prohibitively ex-
pensive. Other times the collaboration will be too important to
forego without abandoning the project altogether.1o
In the Sections that follow, we first explore observability
and then uncertainty and show how production of creative prod-
ucts moves from an individual outside a firm to a team within a
firm.
1. The effects of unobservability on the organization of
creative team production.
Imagine two authors who wish to collaborate to produce a
highly creative book. The output of their efforts is a function of
their inputs. In the monitoring role, a manager could observe
the time the authors spend typing, sitting quietly awake (pre-
sumably thinking), sketching out ideas, or surfing the Internet.
This monitoring will be imperfect. A manager might observe
what she thinks is the author thinking, when in fact the author
is daydreaming. A long coffee break might be exactly what the
author needs for the optimal burst of thought when she returns
to work. In this scenario, where the manager cannot adequately
observe the authors' efforts, it will be very difficult to form a
firm. And because of the problems of team production described
above, it is unlikely that the two authors will be able to success-
fully collaborate.
Now suppose that there are signals that can be correlated to
actual input, and that the signals cannot be mimicked or faked.
In these circumstances, it will be possible for managers to serve
a useful monitoring function, and it is more likely that a hierar-
chy or firm will be used to organize production. Note that the
70 The exact dynamics of the tradeoff are difficult to quantify. That being said,
there is evidence suggesting that more creative movies will be made in smaller firms. See
Gil and Spiller, Organizational Implications of Creativity at *912, 41 (cited in note 9).
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increased observability-which is generally associated with the
ability to write more complete contracts-leads here to an in-
crease rather than a decrease in the likelihood of organization in
a firm. The particular expertise of any given manager will be in
better assessing the signals of actual input (and adjusting pro-
duction accordingly) than other potential managers. The more
accurate the manager is in observing clues of input, the higher
output will be and the more value the manager will produce for
herself.
This may explain why, for example, The Sound and the Fury
and The Great Gatsby were written by individuals, while Sweet
Valley High was written by a firm.7' Because The Sound and the
Fury owes so much of its value to its creative elements, it would
have been near impossible to monitor a team of authors collabo-
rating in its production. Suppose William Faulkner wanted to
collaborate with F. Scott Fitzgerald to produce The Sound and
the Fury. Before the book is written, no one could know what it
should look like.72 No manager could have observed whether
Faulkner or Fitzgerald was doing what he ought to and there could
be no reliable signals of whether the authors were appropriately de-
scribing the travails of the Compson family in Yoknapatawpha
County.
By contrast, the genre fiction of Sweet Valley High was sus-
ceptible to team production. Although we would not go so far as
to say that creativity was irrelevant to the books' success, we
71 We feel safe asserting that The Sound and the Fury and The Great Gatsby are
higher in creativity than Sweet Valley High. Intriguingly, lists of the top 100 novels of
the twentieth century include no coauthored books; the nonfiction lists typically include
a handful of coauthored books. See, for example, 100 Best Nonfiction (Modern Library
2013), online at http://www.modernlibrary.com/top-100/100-best-nonfiction (visited Nov
24, 2013) (including among the top 100 nonfiction books of the twentieth century William
Strunk and E.B. White's The Elements of Style; Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand
Russell's Principia Mathematica; Bert Hoelldobler and Edward 0. Wilson's The Ants;
and Alex Haley and Malcolm X's The Autobiography of Malcolm X); 100 Best Novels
(Modern Library 2013), online at http://www.modernlibrary.com/top-100/100-best-novels
(visited Nov 24, 2013) (including no coauthored works among the top 100 novels of the
twentieth century). This anecdotally provides some support for the idea that as the rela-
tive importance of creativity decreases, the feasibility of collaborative production in-
creases. Still, because these nonfiction teams were not hierarchical, they tell us little
about our central inquiry. For a more rigorous test of the prediction about creativity in
the context of hierarchical structure in the movie industry, see Gil and Spiller, Organiza-
tional Implications of Creativity at *41 (cited in note 9) (finding that an increased de-
mand for creative films led to a significant decrease in internal studio production of
films).
72 Ex ante knowledge of what the product will be means that the product cannot, by
definition, be creative. See note 10.
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can at least say that they did not depend as heavily on their cre-
ative aspects for their value.73 If a group of authors wanted to
produce Sweet Valley High, a skilled manager might therefore
have been able to observe whether any given author's contribu-
tions were adequate by observing the quantity of output and its
adherence to a well-worn style, group of characters, and set of
themes.
And that is precisely how the series was written. Francine
Pascal, the creator of Sweet Valley High, led a team of half a
dozen ghostwriters.74 Pascal provided a "Bible" that described
the series' "characters, place, time and so forth," as well as "a
rambling, stream-of-consciousness outline" for any particular
book.7> Pascal could then evaluate each team member's work by
comparing it to the Bible and outline.76 The team ultimately
managed to produce over five hundred books.77 In short, as the
degree of creativity required for the task decreases, we expect
observability to increase, and the value (and likelihood) of a
managed hierarchy within a firm to increase as well.
Monitoring and contract technology will also influence
whether a hierarchy can add value. Although observability in
the example above was a function of the degree of creativity re-
quired to produce the book, observability may also increase
(holding creativity constant) with advances in technology. Even
simple things like word-processing software incorporating "track
changes" features may enhance a manager's ability to observe
inputs. More advanced tools may increase observability even
73 "'They are frozen in time,' [series creator Francine] Pascal said of her young her-
oines. 'They will never be anything but high-school juniors.' She laughed. 'I know a good
thing when I see it."' Elizabeth Mehren, Publishing's Queen of the Teen Romance Finds
Success with a Formula, LA Times H1 (Apr 20, 1986).
74 See id.
75 Id.
76 See id ("The 'good writers,' Pascal said, 'stay close to what they are told to do,'
churning out an average of one teen title every three months."). For the largely con-
sistent perspective of one of the ghostwriters of the series, see Grace Bello, How Your
Sweet Valley High Gets Made The Hairpin (Aug 8, 2012), online at
http://thehairpin.com/2012/08/how-your-sweet-valley-high-gets-made (visited Nov 24,
2013) ("[T]he would-be writers[] would have to do a two-chapter sample, about 30 pages.
[The editors] have to see that you can match the style and the tone and pull the heart-
strings of anonymous 13-year-old girls across the country."); id ("Basically, what you're
trying to do is emulate a consistent tone throughout the series.").
77 The main series produced almost two hundred books, and the various spin-offs-
including Sweet Valley Twins, The Unicorn Club, and Sweet Valley University-added
over two hundred more. See Wikipedia, Sweet Valley High, online at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilSweetValley-High (visited Nov 24, 2013).
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further. For example, one recent study identified unique brain
activity that was associated with freestyle (improvised) rapping
that was not associated with rehearsed rapping.78 Another study
using advanced data gathering and modeling techniques indi-
cated that an orchestra performs better the more the musicians
follow the conductor's lead, rather than the lead of other musi-
cians.7 The easier it is to monitor creative effort, the more valu-
able a firm becomes. The same is true as contract methods ad-
vance to create more effective monitoring or penalty-reward
mechanisms.s0 As those increase, all else equal, more creative
production will have the potential to be brought in house.81
This may explain why book-packaging firms started with
Sweet Valley High and progressed to Gossip Girl,82 and why Pa-
per Lantern Lit has entered the market in an attempt to pro-
duce higher-creativity books in the same market space-
improvements in monitoring or contractual technology have
made it possible to bring increasingly creative work in house.8> It
may also explain why, on the other hand, the simplest children's
books have long been written by hourly employees of publishing
houses. In the case of simple children's books, the importance of
78 See generally Siyuan Liu, et al, Neural Correlates of Lyrical Improvisation: AnfMRI Study of Freestyle Rap, 2 Scientific Reports (Nov 15, 2012). This area of study is
growing rapidly and several similar studies on brain monitoring suggest the ability to
observe creative activity.
79 See generally Alessandro D'Ausilio, et al, Leadership in Orchestra Emerges from
the Causal Relationships of Movement Kinematics, 7 PLOS ONE (2012), online at
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0035757 (visited
Nov 24, 2013).
8o See Part I.C.2.
81 In the context of noncreative goods, some commentators have suggested that
monitoring and contract technology will have the exact opposite effect. See George S.
Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 Notre Dame L Rev 955,
958, 993-94 (2007). It is not clear that this will always be the case. As Professor Coase
pointed out in his seminal article on these questions, technological advances can cut ei-
ther way depending on the broader contexts. Coase, 4 Economics at 397 n 3 (cited in note
21) ("[M]ost inventions will change both the costs of organising and the costs of using the
price mechanism. In such cases, whether the invention tends to make firms larger or
smaller will depend on the relative effect on these two sets of costs.").
82 Alloy's predecessor was involved in the production of Sweet Valley High. See Bel-
lo, How Your Sweet Valley High Gets Made (cited in note 76).
83 We feel slightly less comfortable in our assertion that Gossip Girl is, in fact, more
creative than Sweet Valley High than we do in our assertion that The Sound and the Fu-
ry and The Great Gatsby are more creative than Sweet Valley High. But at least the ex-
pansion in genre fiction and targeted audience of firm-authored books suggests that im-
proved technology has led to an expansion of the work that can be effectively produced in
a firm.
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creativity is relatively low,84 so monitoring is relatively straight-
forward and the benefits of a managed hierarchy easier to
obtain.85
To summarize what we have explored so far, a hierarchy
might add value when it is able to overcome the observability
constraint. In these instances, the manager is a specialized mon-
itor who can detect (if imperfectly) whether individual team
members are shirking. The manager in this hierarchy is a cen-
tralized contractual agent who can renegotiate terms with par-
ticular inputs without necessitating renegotiation among all in-
puts. The manager should have the residual claim to the team's
output so that she has the incentive to manage efficiently. For
ease of exposition, we will refer to a firm organized along these
lines as an Alchian and Demsetz firm, after the authors of the
seminal article describing these organizations.
2. The effects of uncertainty on the organization of
collaborative creative production.
If observability is limited, then the firm might play a role in
reducing moral hazard through enforcement of penalties and
rewards. Both authors must perform and not shirk for the book
to do well. If one author shirks and the other performs, it will be
mediocre. If both shirk, it will be bad. But the shirking is unob-
servable and unverifiable. There is a free-rider problem. With
some payouts, the equilibrium will be that no one performs.
One solution would be for the authors to impose a penalty
on each author if the book is not good. The penalty has to be giv-
en to a third party or the value must be destroyed. By imposing
this penalty, no author can gain by shirking. In equilibrium,
they will all perform. But the authors cannot credibly adopt this
penalty mechanism because it will never be enforced. Ex post,
84 By simple children's books we mean genres like learning-to-read books that im-
port plots from movies and other books. For example, books like King Kong: Kong's
Kingdom or The Dark Knight: Batman's Friends and Foes adapt movie plots to short
storylines for children. The authors are often hourly employees, and one author of such
books indicated to us that there is very little creativity involved. She suggested that non-
creative technical writing skills that she referred to as "craft" were more important and
also more observable than creativity "particularly when you've been given the plot by the
editor who hired you."
85 If other factors favor firms over individuals (ease of obtaining financing or mar-
keting, for example), the overall supply of outputs to the market will become more col-
laborative but potentially less creative.
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they will agree to relieve each other of the penalty. Thus, no
penalty can be enforced to increase the incentives to avoid shirking.
This is where the manager of a team hierarchy comes in.
The manager administers the penalty.86 Note that it is key that
the manager is not also an author. If the manager is an author,
then she has the same incentive to shirk and renegotiate penal-
ties as any other author. This solution works independently of
monitoring.
The above example assumes certainty. That is, it assumes
that the metric for a "good" book can be set ex ante. Uncertainty
reduces the effectiveness of the team manager in creating the
proper incentives because it is unknown what the product will
look like if all authors perform. A probabilistic penalty will be
needed, but this introduces risk for those who do not shirk. The
effectiveness of this penalty will thus depend on probability, risk
aversion, and endowment constraints. Constrained or risk-
averse authors will exit the relationship rather than risk paying
the penalty even if they fully perform.87
It may be useful, in cases of significant (but not absolute)
uncertainty with some endowment constraint, to have a reward
or penalty that is tied in part to a future relationship and to the
input provider's value to that future relationship.88
Assume that project 1 will open the door for a related pro-
ject 2. Batman Begins makes The Dark Knight possible. Assume
also that the input providers will benefit from being involved in
project 2. They have made specific investments that carry over
from project 1 to project 2 but not to other projects. Michael
Caine and Christian Bale have achieved a level of chemistry as
Alfred and Bruce Wayne that would be costly for them to recre-
ate in any other roles. If the manager has the ability to permit
or prohibit input participation in project 2, she can use that abil-
ity to create bonuses for success on project 1. That is, if project 1
has a certain level of success, the manager will keep the team
together for the follow-up project.
To use the numbers from Part I.B.2 above, Caine is Xi and
Bale is X2. Once again:
86 The penalty can also be structured as a reward. See text accompanying note 53.
87 See Holmstrom, 13 Bell J Econ at 328-30 (cited in note 24). The problem be-
comes even more complicated as uncertainty increases-the high end of payouts could be
completely unknowable and the intermediate values could be a continuous variable. See id.
88 See id ("In a dynamic context the punishment ... can be interpreted as a threat
to discontinue cooperation.").
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X1 = 3 or 1 and X2 = 3 or 1
if (Xi,X2) = (3,3) then y = 7
if (X,X 2) = (3,1) or (1,3) then y = 4
if (X,X 2) = (1,1) then y = 2.
They need a manager to impose a penalty if they produce less
than 7. Now assume the extra value of working together on The
Dark Knight as opposed to another movie like The Prestige89 is
greater than 1 (.5 each).90 The threat of being excluded from The
Dark Knight is a sufficient penalty to guarantee that they do not
shirk on Batman Begins. If the outcome is below 7, the produc-
ers will have an incentive to push Bale and Caine out as long as
any average team could be expected to have done as well. But in
the end they won't have to because now Bale and Caine will of-
fer to work on The Dark Knight for less than any other team to
avoid the cost of lost chemistry.91
But if the negotiated discount is at least 1,92 then shirking is
off the equilibrium path. Knowing that if they shirk they will be
penalized by negotiating away 1 or more to work on The Dark
Knight, Bale and Caine will perform well in the first place. They
will produce 7. They will be more valuable to the producers than
any average team, they will be kept on for the sequel, and they
will share in the surplus.93
This only works because the manager has the right to ex-
clude them from project 2. If any other manager could produce
89 The Prestige was a film released shortly after Batman Begins starring Christian
Bale and Michael Caine. It too was directed by Christopher Nolan. See The Prestige
(Touchstone Pictures 2006); Batman Begins (Warner Bros. 2005).
90 You could imagine that the 1 of effort that even a shirker puts in results in this
chemistry worth something like 1.1 and is transferable to project 2 no matter the out-
come.
91 This is what Professors Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian
call an "appropriable quasi rent." See Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 21 J L & Econ at
299 (cited in note 4). Here that quasi rent is serving a valuable binding role.
92 Depending on the bargaining positions, lost chemistry may need to be greater
than 1 for this to work. The producers and the actors may split some fraction of it. See
Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 Econometrica 97, 99
(1982). But the point remains that if the penalty is at some minimum level, they will not
shirk.
93 See id.
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The Dark Knight there would be no penalty to Bale and Caine
from being excluded, and they would not have any incentive to
produce the right amount on project 1. They would go to a differ-
ent studio with their chemistry intact and make The Dark
Knight there. They would be worse off than if they could have
bound themselves to the first studio and aligned their incen-
tives.
This method of reward might be particularly useful in the
context of creativity because it can provide a solution in some
cases even when the target of 7 is unknowable until after the
project is completed. Before the movie is made, the producers
might have no way of gauging the market. But after release they
might see more clearly that a performing team would produce 7
and a shirking team would produce 4 or less. But the studio has
the incentive to keep Bale and Caine if they produce better than
the average. And they have the right incentive to kick them out
if they don't. Thus, Bale and Caine need not know the target
number. All they need to know is that the producer will have
some reasonable ex post sense of whether the team worked or
not. The incentive of the parties with relation to project 2 be-
comes an enforcement mechanism for the penalty or reward on
project 1. As we discuss below, this may be a primary unidenti-
fied value of the derivative-works right.
Some may worry that a successful team member will be too
successful and gain holdup against the manager. If a team
member performs at the very top and becomes indispensable to
the sequel, she will be able to demand a large chunk of the sur-
plus.94 But this should not worry us because, in these circum-
stances, this mechanism becomes an information-forcing rule.
The potential for holdup creates an incentive for especially
skilled team input providers to seek team membership and to
work hard once they are selected. To the extent that an input
provider can make herself essential to the project, she will be
rewarded with bargaining power. That essential nature will of-
ten manifest itself in value for the team. Because there is an in-
formation asymmetry between the manager and the input pro-
viders regarding the providers' skill levels, this mechanism can
facilitate optimal team formation by ensuring that skilled input
providers have reason to reveal themselves.
94 See id.
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Television production may provide examples of this. When
casting the first season of The Sopranos, the firm owns the right
to the second season. If the first season hits a certain level of
success, then a second season is likely to go forward. Of course,
if the manager observes any one member slacking, she can expel
her. But if effort is not observable, team success in season 1 may
be a sufficient metric to justify reward of participation in season
2 for the entire team. On the opposite extreme, if one member
makes herself essential to the project, she can acquire a share of
the surplus the project created to keep her on board for the sec-
ond season. Thus, James Gandolfini had the ability to holdup
the firm. This could be viewed as the optimal outcome. Everyone
who thinks he can be James Gandolfini has an incentive to try
to do so. They may even agree to work for a lower initial salary.
The reward is ex post in the form of a payment for the second
season. If all cast members make themselves essential,9> the pro-
ject will do very well and they can, as a team, demand a surplus
for subsequent seasons. Whole-cast contractual renegotiations
for very successful TV shows-from Friends to Modern Family-
might be an example of this.96 The surplus only exists because
(1) the actors created value and (2) the studios own the deriva-
tive-works rights.
An additional value of the firm in these contexts (consistent
with Professor Williamson as well as Professors Alchian and
Demsetz) is that James Gandolfini does not have to negotiate
with the other cast members. This avoids costly haggling, emp-
ty-core problems, and the general risk of negotiation breakdown
when essential players demand their reward.
Because the reward is in the form of a subsequent project
and that project's value is based on the success of the initial pro-
ject, the reward is tied (very roughly) to the input-output rela-
tionship even when uncertainty is very high.9 This also makes it
95 These dynamics become more problematic if an actor becomes essential merely
because the audience does not take well to switching actors. Shows and movies have fre-
quently dealt with the death or exit of an actor by recasting a character or introducing a
new character. Whether those switches hurt the shows is difficult to measure.
96 See Bill Carter, 'Friends' Cast Bands Together to Demand a Salary Increase, NY
Times C18 (July 16, 1996); Dorothy Pomerantz, 'Modern Family' Cast Plays Hardball
with Fox over Salary Negotiations, Forbes (July 24, 2013), online at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorothypomerantz/2012/07/24/modern-family-cast-plays-hardball
-with-fox-over-salary-negotiations (visited Nov 24, 2013).
97 This mechanism does not exacerbate the moral-hazard problem to the extent a
profit-sharing arrangement would.
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easier to break the budget-balancing constraint. Extreme
shirking is avoided by monitoring, moderate shirking might be
avoided by the fear of being dispensable or the show being can-
celed, and high effort (at least where the input provider knows
or believes she is high talent) can be encouraged by the carrot of
getting a huge chunk of the surplus that may exist in project 2.99
Moreover, even if the parties had signed noncompete
agreements or exclusivity contracts that bound the team, the
reward of participation in season 2 is worth much less if other
firms are creating alternative versions.100 The reward of future
98 This is a key characteristic of the penalty-reward mechanism. See Holmstr6m, 13
Bell J Econ at 330 (cited in note 24).
99 Ted Danson's role on Cheers may be another example of this. As the highest paid
television actor at the time, his decision to leave was the end of the show. See Bill
Carter, Why 'Cheers' Proved So Intoxicating, NY Times H31 (May 9, 1993). In fact, he
had become so essential to the show that syndication deals for the reruns contained a
provision committing the stations to buy all episodes but only if Danson was in them.
See id. This only works if a centralized player (the firm) owns the rights to project 2. If
anyone can make the next season of Cheers, The Sopranos, or Friends or the next Harry
Potter movie, the input providers will be threatening withdrawal and reconstituting
casts in destructive ways. Ted Danson may enter a relationship with a different produc-
tion company to produce a competing version of Cheers. Similarly, Jennifer Aniston may
be contracting with one studio to produce the next season of Friends while Courteney
Cox is negotiating with another. In turn, each cast member will be negotiating side con-
tracts with the other cast members. Contracts between each team member will be neces-
sary to get to equilibrium.
100 By a quirk of disputed copyright ownership, a scenario like this played out in the
production of the James Bond films Thunderball and Never Say Never Again and made
negotiations with the various input providers difficult and costly. The initial screenplay
for Thunderball had been written as a collaboration of at least three people (Ian Flem-
ing, Kevin McClory, and Jack Whittingham). Fleming, without permission from his co-
authors, then turned the screenplay into a novel (also called Thunderball. The other two
authors sued and tried unsuccessfully to enjoin the publication of the novel. The other
claims in the suit were settled with an agreement that Fleming would retain the rights
in the novel but McClory would retain literary and film rights in the screenplay. The film
Thunderball was based on a subsequent screenplay that was (at least in part) based on
Fleming's novel. Thunderball (the film) was produced in 1965 by Eon Productions.
McClory was included as a producer and credited under an agreement that he would not
make another movie based on the first screenplay for ten years. In 1983, after Roger
Moore had become Eon's James Bond star, McClory and an independent production
company hired Sean Connery (who had long since retired from playing Bond for Eon) to
star in Never Say Never Again (based on the initial screenplay of Thunderball). Never
Say Never Again opened within months of Eon Productions's James Bond film Octopussy
starring Roger Moore. McClory announced his intent to make other Bond movies
through the 1990s and at one point Sony bought McClory's rights and announced its in-
tent to make a new Bond franchise to compete with MGM. A lawsuit and settlement be-
tween Sony and MGM (but not McClory) followed. See DanJaq LLC v Sony Corp, 263
F3d 942, 947-50 (9th Cir 2001); Graham Rye, Kevin McClory; Co-author of the 'Thunder-
ball' Screenplay Who Sued Ian Fleming, The Independent 50 (Dec 7, 2006). Sony also
owned the rights (including film) to the first Bond book, Casino Royale, which it traded
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participation is less effective when its value can be diluted by
other firms appropriating the derivative value. This problem
may not be large: if the team that makes season 1 is successful,
it will have the competitive advantage in producing season 2 re-
gardless of the property rights. But the rights to produce the
second season provide greater certainty about the value of the
reward the manager can offer. Alternatively, the firm's exclusive
right to produce the second season might be viewed as a default
rule that captures the benefits of team-wide noncompete agree-
ments with reduced transaction costs. This focus on the reward
value of the rights in project 2 may form the basis for a theory of
copyright law's derivative-works right. We explore this and oth-
er intellectual property rules through the team-production lens
in the next Part.'o'
Before doing so, though, we pause to summarize the key fea-
tures of these organizations. While in the Alchian and Demsetz
firm the manager adds value primarily by acting as a specialized
monitor, here the manager adds value by enforcing penalties or
doling out rewards. Those penalties and rewards are triggered
by whether the team's output meets some threshold. The key
skill for the manager here is in properly setting expectations
that trigger penalties or rewards. The manager is again the cen-
tralized contractual agent-this avoids the possibility of renego-
tiation among input providers that would otherwise undermine
the efficacy of the penalty mechanism. For this reason, the man-
ager should not be a provider of inseparable inputs; otherwise,
she too would have an incentive to renegotiate. For expository
convenience, we will refer to firms that operate to overcome un-
certainty by setting appropriate expectations as Holmstrom
firms, after the author of the seminal article describing these
organizations. 102
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
What does this analysis mean for intellectual property law?
Or, to ask the same question from the other direction, how does
intellectual property law facilitate or impede the optimal organi-
zation of creative production?
to MGM as part of settlement. See Janet Sphrintz, Big Bond-Holder, Variety (Mar 29,
1999), online at http://variety.com/1999/film/news/big-bond-holder-1117492814 (visited
Nov 24, 2013).
101 See Part II.
102 See generally Holmstr6m, 13 Bell J Econ 324 (cited in note 24).
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Two kinds of intellectual property rules are especially im-
portant here: allocation rules and scope rules. Allocation rules
determine to whom the initial grant of intellectual property
goes. Scope rules determine what exactly the owner of the intel-
lectual property gets. In the discussion that follows, we will fo-
cus on copyright law and the creative goods it regulates, but the
analysis here likely applies to intellectual property more gener-
ally because (1) collaborative creative production occurs across
all fields regulated by intellectual property, and (2) scope and al-
location rules are endemic to all intellectual property law. We
leave for another day a complete exploration of how the team-
production theories we emphasize affect the technology-oriented
industries (and, by extension, patent law).03
A. Allocation of Rights
As noted above, firms or managed hierarchies arise in large
part because it is difficult to allocate inputs to outputs. If it were
easy to do so, then parties could simply write contracts that tied
an input's rewards to its output. In designing an intellectual
property regime sensitive to the problems identified by theorists
of the firm, we should therefore aim to distinguish works created
under conditions in which it is easy to allocate inputs to outputs
from those created under conditions in which it is difficult to so
allocate. And the structure of ownership-how many copyrights
vest in a work and in whom do those rights vest-ought to be
sensitive to the conditions in which the work was created.
While copyright law in some instances applies different allo-
cation rules depending on whether a scenario poses team-
production problems, the corresponding ownership structure
does not line up well with the prescriptions of the team-
production theories. As a result, we make some suggestions for
how copyright law might build upon its foundation to better
support collaborative creative production.104
103 See Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 Harv
J L & Tech 1, 20-26 (1999) (describing how team-production problems may arise in tech-
nology-oriented industries, and identifying evidence indicating the pervasiveness of
these problems).
104 We assume that facilitating efficient collaboration is a valuable outcome. There
may be normative objections to this. The analysis is still relevant; it just provides in-
sights on what to avoid if the goal is to discourage collaborative creation. And of course,
copyright law has many other goals unrelated to the formation of collaborative teams,
and perhaps some goals that conflict with that formation. We focus here on the new light
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1. Authorship: distinguishing among modes of production.
To devise sensible allocation rules, copyright law must be
attentive to the conditions under which a work is created. Some
might raise no team-production problems; others might raise se-
rious ones. As described below, copyright law relies on both the
number of creative inputs and the nature of the outputs in dis-
tinguishing among works.
a) Ordinary works. Perhaps the easiest case for allocating
inputs to outputs is when a single person works alone to produce
a creative work. Think here of a Picasso or Pollock painting. In
these instances, all of the value of the creative work is due to the
effort of the painter, working alone. At least as a first cut, then,
the painter should be the sole owner of the copyright.
And that's how copyright law works. Ordinarily, copyright
vests initially in the author-that is, the person who first fixes
an original idea in a tangible medium of expression.os When a
person comes up with an idea and turns it into something that
other people can experience, she is the author and owns the cop-
yright in her product.
Even this simple case, though, is perhaps a bit more compli-
cated. All artists are, to greater and lesser degrees, products of
their influences-there are few, if any, sui generis producers of
creative works. In extreme instances, a producer of a work
might owe such a heavy debt to previous works that she ceases
to be a single person working alone to produce a creative work;
instead, the work had been produced by those who came be-
fore.1o6 In such instances, the producer should not own the copy-
right.
Something like this may explain L. Batlin & Son, Inc v
Snyder.107 Toy piggy banks made of metal and featuring a figure
of Uncle Sam had been sold since the late 1880s.1os Jeffrey
Snyder registered a copyright for an Uncle Sam bank that was
made of plastic.'oe Snyder's bank was based on the well-known
that the team-production view sheds on copyright law. Integration with other aims of
copyright law is a larger future project.
105 See 17 USC § 201(a); Community for Creative Non-Violence v Reid, 490 US 730,
737 (1989).
106 There are also instances in which a producer might be thought to be collaborat-
ing with those who came before. Those instances are within the purview of the deriva-
tive-works doctrine. See Part II.B.
107 536 F2d 486 (2d Cir 1976).
108 See id at 488.
109 See id.
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metal versions, and contained a few modifications to account for
differences in the manufacturing process required by the use of
plastic instead of metal.o10 The court rejected Snyder's effort to
enforce his copyright, reasoning that, in producing the plastic
Uncle Sam bank, Snyder did not make "an original contribution
not present in the underlying" metal Uncle Sam bank.111 In oth-
er words, whatever creative input existed in the plastic Uncle
Sam bank could be found in the original metal Uncle Sam bank.
Snyder may have made technical contributions to convert the
existing metal Uncle Sam banks into a plastic one.112 But be-
cause copyright law focuses squarely on creative inputs,"1a it
would not govern the allocation of Snyder's input to the output
here, even if other legal regimes might.114
In the mainstream case, though, we may think of a producer
acting alone as a sole author notwithstanding the influences of
prior works. David Foster Wallace owed at least some portion of
his achievements to the influences of Thomas Pynchon and Don
DeLillo, among others. But because Wallace's contribution to In-
finite Jest was so much greater than that of anyone else, it none-
theless seems right to say that Wallace was a single person
working alone to produce that novel, and we can best allocate
outputs to inputs by granting Wallace-and only Wallace-a
copyright in Infinite Jest.11s
110 See id.
111 L. Batlin & Son, 536 F2d at 491 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
112 See id at 488.
113 See Feist Publications, Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co, 499 US 340, 345 (1991)
(holding that the Constitution requires that a work incorporate at least a minimal de-
gree of creativity in order to obtain copyright protection).
114 In L. Batlin & Son, the putative author did not contribute enough of his own cre-
ative input to merit a copyright. Where the putative author does contribute enough of
her own creative input to merit a copyright, but also owes a particularly heavy burden to
a prior copyrighted work, team-production problems may arise. This is because it is hard
to allocate the output-the later work-to the two creative inputs-the author of the
original work and the author of the later work. In these instances, the derivative-works
doctrine may facilitate the organization of team-production firms. See Part II.B.
115 This view of a single author is consistent with the Western idea of "the romantic
author." It can and has been criticized for ignoring communal collaboration, generational
collaboration, and the general cultural inputs to creation. Because American copyright
law is largely based on the Western idea of the romantic author, we focus on that concept
here. But there is much more work to be done in thinking about these theories through
broader concepts of authorship. For now, it is worth noting that many of the features in
copyright law that we identify as hindering collaboration are the exact features that de-
rive from the narrow western view. These limit the scope of copyright's domain. Thus,
our suggestion below that we move away from "authorship" as the defining characteristic
of copyrights will also facilitate a more comprehensive treatment of works that do not fit
into this western view of the romantic author. See generally, Peter Jaszi, Toward a
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b) Collective works. Now suppose a work owes its origin to
more than one creative input. Even in these situations, it might
sometimes be easy to distinguish the contributions of each input.
If so, team-production problems would not arise.
These are what copyright calls collective works.11
6 When the
outputs of several inputs "constitut[e] separate and independent
works in themselves,"117 it is possible to allocate inputs to out-
puts, and copyright law therefore endows each piece with a dis-
tinct copyright. There is a copyright in each contribution and a
separate copyright in the collective work as a whole.1"8 The copy-
right for each contribution vests in the author of that contribu-
tion, and the copyright in the collective work as a whole vests in
the person who selected and arranged the collective work as a
whole.119 The copyright in a given work that is part of a collective
work can earn royalties separate from the others, can be
adapted into other formats separately from the others, and can
be reproduced without regard to the other inputs (or their inter-
ests). This makes it easier for each input provider to obtain re-
wards calibrated to her output.
c) Joint works. Still, there will be situations in which it will
be difficult to distinguish the contributions of each input to the
creative work. In such cases, team-production problems may
arise.
Copyright law has a category that appears to fit this case
well. It is called a joint work: "A work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship", 1991 Duke L J 455; Daniela
Simone, Dreaming Authorship: Copyright Law and the Protection of Indigenous Cultural
Expression (unpublished draft) (on file with authors); Megan M. Carpenter, Intellectual
Property Law and Indigenous Peoples: Adapting Copyright Law to the Needs of a Global
Community, 7 Yale Hum Rts & Dev L J 51 (2004); Lucy M. Moran, Intellectual Property
Law Protection for Traditional and Sacred "Folklife Expressions"-Will Remedies Become
Available to Cultural Authors and Communities?, 6 U Balt Intell Prop L J 99 (1998);
Daniel J. Gervais, Spiritual but Not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred Intangible
Traditional Knowledge, 11 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L 467 (2003); Shun-ling Chen, Collab-
orative Authorship: From Folklore to the Wikiborg, 2011 U Ill J L Tech & Pol 131. See
also Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Re-
appraisal of the Tensions between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the
United States, 48 Am U L Rev 769, 795-96 (1999).
116 A collective work is "a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclope-
dia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in
themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." 17 USC § 101.
117 See 17 USC § 101.
"s See 17 USC § 201(c).
119 See 17 USC § 101(c).
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into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."20
The joint work gets a single copyright, and each author of a joint
work owns an equal share in the whole.121
It is difficult, if not impossible, to allocate inputs to outputs
when the inputs are "inseparable or interdependent parts" and
the output is "a unitary whole."122 The team-production theory
tells us these kinds of works are different from those for which
the inputs are separate and independent and the output is not a
unitary whole. The production of these kinds of works is best or-
ganized when the team's output results in a single modular
property right. And that is how copyright law responds to these
works.
The law does not attempt to delineate distinct property
rights in the output of each individual team member. Because
team production is characterized by output that can be greater
than the sum of the inputs, and because it is difficult to allocate
output to inputs, any effort to so delineate rights by a team
member would be prohibitively costly.123 If copyright law tried to
create distinct property rights in each team member's input into
a joint work, the team could try to respond by contractually
bundling their disparate property rights into a single structure.
But problems of verifiability would likely stymie any such ef-
forts-it would be impossible for the team members to enforce
contracts mandating particular contributions by individual team
members.
On the team-production view, then, copyright law does well
to distinguish between works created by a single person acting
alone (ordinary works), works created by a group of people act-
ing independently (collective works), and works created by a
group of people acting together (joint works). Only the last of
these poses team-production problems. On the whole, we expect
120 17 USC § 101.
121 When there are two authors, each owns 50 percent of the whole; when there are
three, each owns 33.3 percent. Each author may exploit the work herself or grant a non-
exclusive license without the consent of the others, although complications arise regard-
ing exclusive licenses. Compare Sybersound Records, Inc v UAV Corp, 517 F3d 1137,
1144-46 (9th Cir 2008) (concluding that authors of joint works may transfer nonexclu-
sive licenses, but not exclusive ones), with Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright § 6.10 (Lexis 2012) (disagreeing with Sybersound and arguing
that, at least for purposes of standing to sue, a transferee of a license from a joint author
may be considered exclusive). Joint authors have a duty to account to other joint authors.
122 17 USC § 101.
123 See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements
in Information, 116 Yale L J 1742, 1759 (2007).
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that ordinary works and collective works will be produced by or-
ganizations that do not resemble team-production firms; joint
works, however, will be produced by organizations that do re-
semble such firms.
i) Identifying authors of a joint work. By avoiding the delin-
eation process for joint works and instead combining all "insepa-
rable or interdependent parts" into a single ownership bundle,
copyright law therefore takes a step to facilitate the organiza-
tion of creative collaborative production. But the facilitation is
incomplete. The joint-works concept does nothing to facilitate
organization in a hierarchy or promote the roles of a manager
that are valuable to creative production. Although the law cor-
rectly recognizes the problem of identifying authorship, the solu-
tion does nothing to facilitate efficient ownership and control.
As an example of the flaws in copyright's treatment of joint
works, consider Aalmuhammed v Lee.124 Jefri Aalmuhammed
had previously written, directed, and produced a documentary
about Malcolm X.125 Denzel Washington was starring in Spike
Lee's film Malcolm X, which was being produced by Warner
Bros.126 Washington asked Aalmuhammed to help him prepare
for the part.127 Aalmuhammed's role expanded, though, and he
eventually made "independently copyrightable" contributions to
the film, including writing scenes that made it to the finished
version.128 After the film's box office success, Aalmuhammed
124 202 F3d 1227 (9th Cir 2000). This is not an isolated case. For similar examples,
see generally Richlin v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc, 531 F3d 962 (9th Cir 2008)
(analyzing a copyright dispute involving the Pink Panther film franchise); Davis v Blige,
505 F3d 90 (2d Cir 2007) (analyzing a copyright dispute involving Mary J. Blige's songs
"LOVE" and "Keep It Moving"); Gaiman v McFarlane, 360 F3d 644 (7th Cir 2004) (ana-
lyzing a copyright dispute involving the comic book series Spawn); Thomson v Larson,
147 F3d 195 (2d Cir 1998) (analyzing a copyright dispute involving the play Rent).
125 Aalmuhammed, 202 F3d at 1229.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id at 1229-32. Aalmuhammed also did several other things that undoubtedly
wouldn't suffice to support his claim of authorship. See id at 1231 (noting, for example,
that Aalmuhammed spoke in Arabic to people working at a mosque at which the movie
was filming). One might also contend that because Aalmuhammed's contributions were
primarily aimed at ensuring factual accuracy, they might not be extended much, if any,
copyright protection. See, for example, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enter-
prises, 471 US 539, 547 (1985). But the court nonetheless concluded that Aalmuhammed
made an independently copyrightable contribution with at least some of his work on the
film, so neither of these arguments was a sufficient basis on which to deny his claim of
joint authorship.
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sued, seeking a declaration that he was a joint author of the
film.129
The court rejected Aalmuhammed's claim to authorship.
Even though he had made an independently copyrightable con-
tribution, and "[a]ll persons involved intended that Aalmu-
hammed's contributions would be merged into interdependent
parts of the movie as a unitary whole," the court nonetheless
concluded that Aalmuhammed was not an ."author" within the
meaning of the statutory definition of a joint work-even though
copyright requires only that a putative author demonstrate a
minimal degree of originality in her work in order to obtain a
copyright.130 In this context, too "many people might qualify as
an 'author' if the question were limited to whether they made a
substantial creative contribution."131 So, instead, the Aalmu-
hammed court applied a three-part test requiring (1) that the
putative author exercise control over the work, (2) that there be
"objective manifestations of a shared intent to be coauthors,"
and (3) that the "audience appeal of the work turn[ I] on both
contributions and 'the share of each in its success cannot be
appraised."'132
Aalmuhammed's claim failed largely because he "lacked
control."133 Although Aalmuhammed made helpful contributions,
"Spike Lee was not bound to accept any of them, and the work
would not benefit in the slightest unless Spike Lee chose to ac-
cept them. Aalmuhammed [therefore] lacked control over the
work, and absence of control is strong evidence of the absence of
coauthorship."134
But the team-production theory tells us that this argument
proves too much. No one could satisfy the control requirement-
129 See Aalmuhammed, 202 F3d at 1230.
130 Id at 1232. See also Feist Publications, 499 US at 345.
131 Aalmuhammed, 202 F3d at 1233.
132 Id at 1234.
133 Id at 1235. The court relied principally on Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co v Saro-
ny, in which the Supreme Court held that the term "author" in the Constitution's Intel-
lectual Property Clause encompassed those to whom a work "owes its [origin]." 111 US
53, 57-58 (1884) (holding that a photographer could claim a copyright in a photograph).
Burrow-Giles thus sets only a minimal constitutional hurdle over which putative authors
must jump in order to obtain a copyright. Because the Ninth Circuit (correctly) recog-
nized that Aalmuhammed had made an independently copyrightable contribution to the
work-and had therefore made it over the low constitutional bar-Burrow-Giles cannot
support the court's conclusion that Aalmuhammed had failed to meet some higher statu-
tory bar deriving from the definition of a joint work.
134 Aalmuhammed, 202 F3d at 1235.
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not even Lee. The problem is in the court's insistence that the
author have "control over the work."3> As our analysis above in-
dicates, no creative input has (or even can have) control over the
work as a whole.136 Problems of observability, verifiability, allo-
cation, and uncertainty prevent such control over an individual
input.137 To greater and lesser degrees in particular instances,
creative inputs to a collaborative process cannot be compelled to
do particular things; this is what gives rise to the team-
production problem.
Taking the Aalmuhammed court's example of a clear case of
joint authorship,138 Gilbert could no more compel Sullivan to
write the best music for his lyrics than Aalmuhammed could
compel Lee to integrate his revisions to the script. And even if
Gilbert had the contractual right to compel Sullivan to compose
music for lyrics that Gilbert wrote, he could not control the crea-
tive aspects of that composition. Similarly, no enforceable con-
tract could obligate Lee to dedicate the same degree of creative
skill and effort to directing scenes written by Aalmuhammed as
scenes written by Lee. But that does not mean that neither Gil-
bert and Sullivan nor Aalmuhammed and Lee qualify as authors
of joint works.139
The better approach is simply to determine whether a puta-
tive author was a creative input making "inseparable or inter-
dependent" contributions to a "unitary whole." That is what the
statute commands,140 and it describes precisely the role of a
member of a team-production firm.
ii) Ownership structure of joint works. The decision in Aal-
muhammed was ultimately not driven by a concern about who
135 Id.
136 See Part II.A.1.
137 See, for example, Aalmuhammed, 202 F3d at 1235. Indeed, for this reason, it's
doubtful that even Lee had "control over the work" in this sense. After all, he could no
more compel Washington to perform in a certain way than Aalmuhammed could compel
Lee to film the scenes Aalmuhammed wrote. See Easter Seal Society for Crippled Chil-
dren and Adults of Louisiana, Inc v Playboy Enterprises, 815 F2d 323, 337 (5th Cir 1987)
(noting that the contributing "authors" to a motion picture include the actors, among
others).
138 See Aalmuhammed, 202 F3d at 1232.
139 See id.
140 See 17 USC § 101. The statute also requires that the parties have intent to
merge their contributions. The "coauthors [must] make objective manifestations of a
shared intent to be coauthors." Aalmuhammed, 202 F3d at 1234. This requirement
seems justified largely to prevent participants in a collaborative production from divest-
ing each other of authorship status by secretly intending not to merge. In any event, the
intent requirement is tangential to our concerns here.
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might qualify as an author. The court recognized that the defini-
tion of an author (at least in the film context) might encompass
producers, directors, editors, cinematographers, actors, or
animators.141
The court's worry was, instead and rightly, about owner-
ship. All other participants had signed work-for-hire agreements
with Warner Bros.; if Aalmuhammed had prevailed on his joint-
authorship claim, he would have held a 50 percent share in Mal-
colm X, with Warner Bros. owning the other 50 percent. The
court's effort to avoid that plainly misguided result led it to deny
Aalmuhammed his (plausibly correct) claim to joint authorship.
For our purposes, though, this merely demonstrates that the
ownership structure that copyright law applies to a joint work is
inappropriate. The key is that authorship should be a distinct
concept from ownership and control. The team-production theo-
ries tell us that ownership in the team's output should not be
equally distributed among the several creative inputs (the au-
thors). Instead, ownership of the work (and, through it, posses-
sion of the residual claim) ought to vest in the team's manag-
er.142 The joint-work doctrine gives us no tools by which to do so.
Managers might not be making creative contributions to a work;
joint authors must make such contributions.143 Instead, we must
turn to another allocation rule that frequently arises in joint-
authorship cases: the work-made-for-hire doctrine.
2. Author-owned works and works made for hire.
The work-made-for-hire doctrine could be used to place cop-
yrights in the hands of a valuable team manager. But courts
now invoke the doctrine based on factors that are not tied to the
value that a manager can add. As a result, the doctrine's poten-
tial for facilitating collaborative creativity has been left
untapped.
141 See Aalmuhammed, 202 F3d at 1232.
142 Of course there may be some instances where, notwithstanding the high level of
collaborative creativity, the parties enter a partnership. We predict that those relation-
ships will be more likely to occur where other factors-like reputation and repeat play-
are constraining moral hazard. We would also expect that those agreements will have
little contractual specification. See, for example, Gaiman, 360 F3d at 649-50. We would
also expect them to be fragile and subject to failure if the reputational constraints are
not as strong as expected. Id.
143 It is unclear whether those contributions must be independently copyrightable.
Compare Aalmuhammed, 202 F3d at 1231, with Gaiman, 360 F3d at 658-59.
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The default rule is that copyright ownership vests initially
in the author of a work.144 This simple rule works well when
there is only one author. If there is only one input to a creative
work, then we can provide rewards commensurate with produc-
tion simply by granting that input exclusive rights in the output.
This is because the value of those exclusive rights depends (al-
most) entirely on the value contributed by the input.145 It also
works well when there are multiple inputs making separable
and independent contributions to a larger work. Each contribu-
tion can be distinguished from the others at reasonable cost, and
the value of the exclusive rights associated with each contribu-
tion will depend (almost) entirely on the value contributed by
each input. These two cases-the sole author and the collective
work-do not present the team-production problems with which
we are primarily concerned.
When there are several inputs making "inseparable and in-
terdependent contributions" to a "unitary whole," it is more dif-
ficult to establish an appropriate ownership structure. 146 This is
the team-production scenario, and it is what copyright law calls
a joint work. Creative team production is optimized in a struc-
ture containing a manager who observes (in the Alchian and
Demsetz view) or a manager who can reward or punish (in the
Holmstrom view). In some instances, these roles may be divided
between two managers. On a sports team, you might have an
owner or general manager who enforces rewards and penalties
and a coach who monitors. In a film production, the monitoring
may be done by a director, while an executive producer or studio
head might enforce rewards and penalties.
144 See 17 USC § 201(a). "As a general rule, the author is the party who actually
creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expres-
sion entitled to copyright protection." Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 US at
737.
145 We say almost because there are surely factors independent of the author that
affect the value of a creative work. For an intriguing example of the social factors affect-
ing the commercial success of a creative work, see Cass R. Sunstein, How Social Dynam-
ics Made You Successful, Bloomberg View (Bloomberg Sept 25, 2012), online at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-25/sugar-man-s-lesson-for-markets-and-politicians.
html (visited Nov 24, 2013). In part because the value of a creative work is not due ex-
clusively to the efforts of the sole author, copyright's regime of exclusive rights is limited
by doctrines like fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy. These limits mediate the
relationship between the author and society in general, though, and are therefore not
immediately relevant to our discussion, which concerns the relationship among multiple
authors.
146 17 USC § 101.
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Copyright's default ownership rule for joint works creates a
single bundle of exclusive rights in which each input owns an
equal share. But this ownership default is an impediment to the
formation of team-production firms because it conflicts with the
role of the manager who may not be an author of a joint work.
When she is not an author of the joint work, the manager cannot
(under the default rule) own the exclusive rights to the team's
output and, by extension, the residual claim on the team's output.
Copyright law, though, offers a plausible solution: the work-
made-for-hire doctrine. That doctrine vests ownership initially
in someone other than a creative input if either of two conditions
is met. The first condition is that the creative input to the work
is an employee working within the scope of her employment.147
The second condition is that the work falls within a set of statu-
torily identified works and that the inputs sign written agree-
ments agreeing that the work is "for hire."148
The contractual mechanism is unlikely to effectively facili-
tate collaborative creative production. As a practical matter,
Aalmuhammed and cases like it indicate that contractual failure
is possible even in sophisticated creative organizations.149 As a
theoretical matter, moreover, the contractual mechanism is un-
attractive because it creates a risk of opportunism. Suppose that
two authors and a manager agree that the two authors will
jointly produce a work and, upon completion, assign it to the
manager. In return, the manager retains the residual claim to
their joint output. If it turns out that the work is more valuable
than expected, such that the residual claim is worth more than
the authors anticipated, they will try to escape the agreement so
147 See 17 USC § 201(b) ("[T]he employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright.").
148 See 17 USC § 101:
[A] work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collec-
tive work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a transla-
tion, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a
test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas.
Notably, the list includes motion pictures and excludes sound recordings.
149 See for example, Richlin, 531 F3d at 967-70 (analyzing a copyright dispute in-
volving the Pink Panther film franchise); Davis, 505 F3d at 97-101 (analyzing a copy-
right dispute involving Mary J. Blige's songs "LOVE" and "Keep It Moving"); Gaiman,
360 F3d at 650-55 (analyzing a copyright dispute involving the comic book series
Spawn); Thomson, 147 F3d at 199-205 (analyzing a copyright dispute involving the play
Rent).
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that they can split the residual claim. One simple way to do so
would be to deliver to the manager another work of lower value.
The only way to avoid this would be for the manager to have
written a contract that, before the work was created, specified
with sufficient detail what precisely the authors would deliver.150
But because the work is the product of a creative process involv-
ing novel elements residing in the minds of the authors, it would
be prohibitively costly to delineate in advance the contours of
the work that the authors commit to assign.51 Managers would
be reluctant to take on the monitor's role.
The noncontractual mechanism-which applies a special
ownership structure to a work created by an employee within
the scope of employment-is more promising. In these scenarios,
the hiring party is deemed the author despite the fact that the
hiring party has not made a creative contribution to the work.
Ownership vests initially and only in the hiring party, and this
is true regardless of how many employees contributed. On the
surface, then, this mechanism may facilitate the formation of
team-production firms because its ownership structure-the
vesting of a single residual claim in a manager who is not neces-
sarily providing inseparable inputs to the team's output-
matches that required for a team-production firm. It appears
that the doctrine applies precisely when a team exists-that is,
when there is a manager at the top of the creative hierarchy.
As courts have implemented it, though, the noncontractual
work-made-for-hire mechanism does not line up well with the
structure of the team-production hierarchy that we have been
examining. For a work to default to this ownership structure, it
is not enough for there to be a manager. Rather, there must be a
specific employer-employee relationship and the work must be
created within the scope of that relationship.152 This inquiry is in
turn guided not by any theories of production but by the general
common law of agency. Under that law, the courts' focus in de-
termining whether the relationship is employer-employee is on
150 As this analysis might suggest, the manager might try to eliminate this oppor-
tunistic behavior by demanding the rights to all of the authors' output. This possibility
forms the basis for the employer-employee work-made-for-hire relationship discussed
below.
151 See Smith, 116 Yale L J at 1759 (cited in note 123); Clarisa Long, Information
Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va L Rev 465, 484-85 (2004).
152 Or if, as noted, it is a particular kind of independent contractor relationship.
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the employer's right to control the "manner and means" of
production.53
But the team-production theory-at least as it applies to
curing moral hazard-is specifically addressed to the employer's
inability to control inputs. Perhaps an Alchian and Demsetz
manager can, through observation, at least partially control the
manner of production. But it's doubtful that the Holmstr6m
manager does much that can be considered controlling production.
Of course, given that the work-made-for-hire doctrine was
not enacted, and has not been developed, with the team-
production theory in mind, it is unsurprising that it does not
much reflect the details of that theory. Still, we suggest that a
modified work-made-for-hire doctrine could facilitate the for-
mation of team-production firms. Given the problems we have
identified with the joint-work ownership structure, we suggest
that the work-made-for-hire ownership structure-the vesting of
a residual claim in a manager who does not provide an insepa-
rable input to the team's output-be the default ownership
structure for joint works. Courts may have to do some work to
determine whether a team is organized on Alchian and Demsetz
lines-in which case the manager may be someone like Spike
Lee-or on Holmstrom lines-in which case the manager is more
like Warner Bros.154 Still, it is likely a better approach to the
problem of joint works than the current default, which overcom-
pensates minor contributors to a collaborative effort, ignores
153 Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 US at 751. Courts consider a long list
of context-specific factors in evaluating whether a hiring party has the right to control
the manner and means of production:
[The skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location
of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the
hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the
extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the
method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether
the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax
treatment of the hired party.
Id at 751-52. A court must also determine whether the work was produced within the
scope of that relationship by deciding whether the work is "of the kind [of work the au-
thor] is employed to perform"; whether the work was done during the author's ordinary
work hours; and whether the author was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve
his employer. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958).
154 As noted above, there may be some cases of true joint partnership work. In those
cases, the court would find no identifiable manager. Reputation and repeat play are like-
ly to be constraining moral hazard. But the court can look for these factors. In those cas-
es alone, the default of joint ownership might look the same as it does currently.
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valuable management hierarchy, and thereby encourages oppor-
tunism by the contributors (where it does not entirely frustrate
collaborative efforts at the outset).
B. Scope of Rights-the Derivative-Works Doctrine
The team-production theory also offers insights into the
scope of rights that should be accorded a copyright owner. At the
historical core of copyright law lie the reproduction right (which
allows only the owner to make copies of the original work) and
the distribution right (which allows only the owner to distribute
copies of the original work).155 More recently, the law has grant-
ed copyright holders an exclusive right to prepare a derivative
work-that is, a work "based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatiza-
tion, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording,
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted."16 More
than other copyright doctrines, this form of derivative-works
right protects a pre-expression idea. The first novel in a series
has no protection until the novel is written; but, after that,
something closer to the idea of a sequel has substantial protec-
tion under the derivative-works right. The idea-expression di-
chotomy continues to police the boundary between the protected
expression and unprotected idea.17 Still, the derivative-works
right pushes that boundary much harder than do the reproduction
155 See 17 USC § 106(1) (granting the copyright holder the exclusive right to repro-
duce the work); 17 USC § 106(3) (granting the copyright holder the exclusive right to dis-
tribute the work).
156 17 USC § 101. See also 17 USC § 106(2). By the time the derivative-works right
was formally ensconced in the 1976 Act, however, the courts had already been applying
the reproduction right to cover some of the things we might think of as covered by the
derivative-works right. See, for example, Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp, 45 F2d 119,
121 (2d Cir 1930) (recognizing that "literal appropriation" is not the test for infringement
of the reproduction right, and noting difficulties in discerning when so much "incident
and character" is taken that it constitutes infringement even without copying the words
of the original text). This was in part because a strict reading of the reproduction right
as limited to only verbatim copies was susceptible to evasion by meaningless omissions
from the original work-abridge a few paragraphs here and there, and you are outside
the reach of a strict reproduction right. The derivative-works right goes further, though;
it's not aimed at capturing clever defendants who are trying to evade liability by trivial
modifications. Instead, the derivative-works right seems to add something substantive to
the arsenal of rights granted the author upon creation of the original work: the ability to
prevent others from making new works that incorporate significant portions of the origi-
nal work and creative contributions to it.
157 See Baker v Selden, 101 US 99, 102 (1879).
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and distribution rights. And at a minimum, the derivative-works
right protects expression that the holder of the right has yet to
fix in a tangible medium. For these reasons, the derivative-
works right occupies a unique place in the copyright firma-
ment-something more than the limited rights that copyright
ordinarily offers authors, but something less than the expansive
rights that are associated with Blackstone's "sole and despotic
dominion."15
The derivative-works right has been something of a puzzle
for copyright scholars.169 It might be justified by the same ra-
tionale that underlies copyright's basic incentive-access
tradeoff.16o Granting authors the exclusive right to create deriva-
tive works increases the value of those exclusive rights (because
it allows the authors to control more works), and thereby in-
creases authors' incentives to create in the first place. At the
same time, by restricting access to works that are related to cop-
yrighted works, the derivative-works right imposes social costs.
The question of whether we ought to have a derivative-works
right then turns on whether the increased incentive to create in
the first instance is greater than the increased costs we bear by
restricting access to derivative works.
One problem with this explanation of the derivative-works
right as an additional incentive is that it means we are encour-
aging authors to create more of the kinds of works that lead to
derivatives, but not more of the kinds of works that don't lead to
derivatives-more fantasy novels involving boy wizards and
fewer newspaper articles. It also protects (and therefore encour-
ages the production of) derivatives themselves more than origi-
nal ideas-unlike copyrights in original works, there is no need
to write the sequel to prevent others from doing so.
But this view of the derivative-works right provides no basis
on which to think this kind of distortion of the direction of crea-
tive activity would be desirable. If it's an additional incentive we
seek, it seems the better approach would be an increased copy-
right term, a weaker independent-creation defense, or some
158 William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England, in Four Books 393
(J.B. Lippincott 1886).
159 See Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright's Deriva-
tive Work Right, 101 Georgetown L J 1505, 1532-42 (2013) (rejecting existing theoretical
justifications for the derivative-works right as unsound, and offering an interpretation of
the right informed by the statute's legislative history).
160 See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J
Copyright Socy USA 209, 216 (1983).
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other increase in the value of the copyright that doesn't depend
on the kind of creative work the author produced.
Another similar view suggests that the derivative-works
right is designed to allow authors to proportion their investment
in a work in response to revealed demand for it. 161 The story goes
something like this: Before releasing a novel, an author and her
publisher are unsure how many readers it might draw. So ra-
ther than invest in writing, publishing, marketing, and distrib-
uting the complete novel all at once, they might better produce it
chapter-by-chapter. If chapter 1 is a hit, go ahead and write
chapter 2. Almost surely something like this goes on in the TV
industry, where shows are picked up based on pilots and then
renewed (or cancelled) in accordance with ratings (or lack there-
of). But this view also doesn't account for why the proportioned
investment strategy varies in importance across industries-
while it is the near-exclusive mode of production in the TV in-
dustry, and a dominant mode in the movie industry, it is much
less important to the book publishing industry (although this is
changing), and practically insignificant to the music industry.
An alternative view, articulated by Professor Michael
Abramowicz, contends that the derivative-works doctrine pre-
vents otherwise costly races to produce derivative works.162 De-
rivative works may be close substitutes for each other, such that
the social gains from additional derivatives of a single original
work are often much smaller than the social gains from a new
original work. If so, then the original work may be thought of as
having created an essentially fixed pie of value to be allocated to
the producers of derivative works. That fixed pie represents the
copyright analogue to property law's sunken treasure. 63 The so-
cially optimal result is to allocate the treasure to one party be-
cause that avoids wasteful races to recover it. The derivative-
works right does the same thing by allocating to the creator of
the original work the right to produce the fixed pie of related
works. Without a derivative-works right, we would have subop-
timal product differentiation in the market for creative works.
The extent to which derivatives of a single work substitute
for each other is, however, an open empirical question. If it turns
161 See Randal C. Picker, Fair Use v. Fair Access, 31 Colum J L & Arts 603, 612-14
(2008).
162 See Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright's Derivative Right and Related
Doctrines, 90 Minn L Rev 317, 360 (2005).
163 See id at 349.
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out that the degree of substitutability between one derivative
work and another is roughly the same as the degree of substi-
tutability between a derivative work and an original, then this
explanation of the derivative-works right is unsatisfactory. And
there has been, to date, no empirical demonstration one way or
the other.
1. The derivative-works right and the Holmstram firm.
Our analysis suggests some different views of the deriva-
tive-works doctrine. First, the team-production theory can help
shed light on the effect that a derivative-works right might have
on creative production. The Holmstr6m view suggests that the
best way to organize collaborative creative production is to ap-
point a manager who has the power to reward or punish team
members depending on whether the observed output of the team
as a whole exceeds some threshold. The derivative-works right
may facilitate the formation of a Holmstrom firm in two ways.
First, the derivative-works right may be an effective way to
release the manager in a Holmstrom firm from the budget con-
straint in doling out rewards or punishments. To see why, con-
sider a world in which no derivative-works right exists. Suppose
that several actors wish to make a film and contract with a
manager who will enforce penalties or allocate rewards. The
first option is for profit sharing. But that will be ineffectual be-
cause it is budget constrained and therefore suffers from shirk-
ing problems. Any party that is promised a share of the profit
from the project will benefit from everyone else's effort. The next
alternative is a penalty. Penalties are difficult to negotiate be-
cause the participants may be risk averse or liquidity con-
strained. The alternative is to offer a prize that does not come
out of the profit pool. The prize will be given to the entire team if
a certain threshold of quality is met.
Here is where the derivative-works right has value. The
manager can reward the input providers with participation in
the derivative work (or penalize by exclusion). But without a de-
rivative-works right, the manager would not be able to do that.
If the manager's participation in upcoming derivative works is
subject to the agreement of the creative inputs, then there will
be ex post renegotiation to avoid enforcement of the penalty.164
164 There are some suggestions that highly sophisticated contractual techniques
could avoid the problems described here. See Holden and Malani, Contracts versus Assets
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The derivative-works right helps avoid such renegotiation.
If the manager has the copyright in the original expressive work
created by the team, then she also has the ability, by virtue of
the derivative-works right, to permit or veto participation by
any team member in the creation of closely related works. This
allows the manager (or firm) to penalize (or reward) input pro-
viders (sometimes all of them) by excluding them from (or in-
cluding them in) derivative works. Such penalties and rewards
are evident in movie franchises. Even when a movie is moder-
ately successful, a manager can penalize the team members if
they don't meet expectations. Thus, the penalty may exist even
where there is a profit. The manager, however, is not punished
because she can assemble a new team and-to use the term of
the film industry-pursue a "reboot."
This penalty will be roughly tied to the value the inputs col-
lectively added. If the project achieved only the value that the
average team would be expected to achieve, then the firm loses
nothing by rebooting and hiring a new team that would be ex-
pected to do as well. If the reboot will cause the firm to take a
hit, that suggests the original team produced value over the ex-
pectation for an average team and was not shirking.
The average expectation provides the certainty that is need-
ed in the Holmstrom model. With sufficient certainty, a manag-
er can set a penalty ex ante. Because the output is creative,
though, uncertainty prevents her from doing so here. But be-
cause the derivative-works right sets the value of the penalty
only after the film is released, the manager can update her ex-
pectations (thus increasing certainty) at that point, and define
the penalty ex post. Early uncertainty is not a problem as long
as a good idea of the expected average can be known ex post.
And the manager has no incentive to penalize a value-producing
team wrongfully because that will result in a loss to the manag-
er as well.165
Consider in this light the divergent fates of Batman Begins
and Superman Returns. Both films were well reviewed.166 The
and the Boundary of the Firm at *5 (cited in note 60). These techniques have not, to date,
been widely adopted.
165 This is all based on the assumption that the inputs are not directly observable.
The value is attributed to the entire team. If the team does well but one team member is
demonstrably bad, then the manager can play the monitoring role and expel them.
166 Rotten Tomatoes scores Batman Begins 85 percent fresh and Superman Returns
76 percent. See Batman Begins (2005) (Rotten Tomatoes), online at
http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/batman-begins (visited Nov 24, 2013); Superman
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Christopher Nolan-Christian Bale team's Batman Begins
grossed $374 million worldwide.167 Superman Returns grossed
$391 million worldwide.168 When the Christopher Nolan-
Christian Bale team produced Batman Begins, and it turned out
to be profitable beyond expectations,169 Warner Bros. allowed
them to create The Dark Knight. But when Bryan Singer's Su-
perman Returns came in below the target threshold, Warner
Bros. canceled the sequel and planned a reboot.170 Although the
two films were similar in terms of critical reception and revenue,
one might surmise that the Nolan-Bale team surpassed the ex-
pected production from an average team, but the Singer team
did not.
Profit-sharing agreements would not achieve these results
because they can produce collective-action problems and lock in
expectations before there is sufficient certainty. Indeed, by the
numbers, the movies performed almost identically.171 But Bat-
man Begins beat expectations while Superman Returns missed
them. A Warner Bros. executive reported of the Batman movie,
I think people love the character, and it's been eight years
since the franchise unfortunately took a negative turn [with
Batman and Robin] .... It took the vision of a filmmaker
like Christopher Nolan to bring it back, with a great script
and cast. We're well positioned moving forward with the
summer. We're going to have a first week of $85 million ....
That's enough to bring Batman back for a sequel.172
Returns (2006) (Rotten Tomatoes), online at http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/superman
returns (visited Nov 24, 2013).
167 See Batman Begins (Box Office Mojo), online at http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies
/?id=batmanbegins.htm (visited Nov 24, 2013).
168 See Superman Returns (Box Office Mojo), online at http://www.boxofficemojo.com
/movies/?id=superman06.htm (visited Nov 24, 2013).
169 Expectations were low based on the decline of the previous Batman franchise.
See Brandon Gray, 'Batman Begins' in the Shadows (Box Office Mojo June 20, 2005),
online at http://www.boxofficemojo.cominews/?id=1837 (visited Nov 24, 2013).
170 Expectations were high based on Singer's reputation and the success of recent
comic book movies including Batman Begins but also the Spiderman movies.
171 Domestically, Batman Begins is sixteenth on the all-time list of comic book mov-
ies with a theatrical gross of $206 million. Superman Returns is seventeenth with a gross
of $200 million (and a bigger opening weekend). Worldwide, Superman Returns grossed
$391 million while Batman Begins only grossed $374 million. See Comic Book Adapta-
tion (Box Office Mojo), online at http://boxofficemojo.com/genres/chart/?id=comicbook
adaptation.htm (visited Nov 24, 2013).
172 Gray, 'Batman Begins' in the Shadows (cited in note 169) (alteration in original),
quoting Warner Bros.' Dan Fellman.
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In stark contrast, the Warner Bros. response to Superman Re-
turns was, "I thought it was a very successful movie, but I think
it should have done $500 million worldwide."73 It made $391
million worldwide.74 In the end Warner Bros. concluded that
Superman Returns was just not successful enough (given expec-
tations) to warrant a sequel.17 The studio thus appears to have
used the team's performance relative to expectations as the ba-
sis on which to decide whether to permit that team to partici-
pate in the derivative work.176
To summarize, participation in a derivative work has the
potential to be the reward that the Holmstrom manager can of-
fer team members. That participation can come in different
forms. In the case of Alloy and its production of the Gossip Girl
books, the original lead writer was rewarded with the right to
future writing credits-a very valuable asset for a young writer.
Though she worked on only the first eight novels, her contribu-
tion was rewarded with lead writing credits for four additional
sequels, one prequel, one spin-off novel, and two spin-off se-
ries.177 These credits helped launch her career as a solo author of
173 Horn Planning Superman Sequel for 2009 (SuperHeroHype Aug 18, 2006), online
at http://www.superherohype.com/features/articles/91753-horn-planning-superman-sequel-
for-2009 (visited Nov 24, 2013) (emphasis added), quoting Warner Bros. then-President
Alan Horn.
174 Singer was quite surprised with the Warner Bros. response: "'That movie made
$400 million!' Singer says incredulously. 'I don't know what constitutes under-
performing these days."' Olly Richards, Singer Talks Superman Returns Sequel: Exclu-
sive: Director Confirms Development (Empire Online Mar 12, 2008), online at
http://www.empireonline.com/news/story.asp?NID=22165 (visited Nov 24, 2013), quoting
Bryan Singer.
175 "Had 'Superman' worked in 2006, we would have had a movie for Christmas of
this year or 2009 ... . But now the plan is just to reintroduce Superman." Warner Bros.
Pictures Group President Jeff Robinov, quoted in Lauren A.E. Schuker, Warner Bets on
Fewer, Bigger Movies-DC Comics Characters Play a Big Role; Superheroes Are a 'World-
Wide Export, Wall St J B1 (Aug 22, 2008). The assessment of Batman seems to have
been accurate. The sequels rank two and three on the all-time comic book adaptation list
and are both in the top fifteen of all movies. See Comic Book Adaptation (cited in note
171); Worldwide Grosses (Box Office Mojo), online at http://boxofficemojo.com
/alltime/world (visited Nov 24, 2013).
176 We do not mean to say that Warner Bros.' expectations were necessarily correct.
It is of course possible that the studio's expectations were too low for Batman Begins and
too high for Superman Returns. We mean only to demonstrate that studios make deci-
sions about whether to produce derivative works using the same team, based on whether
the team exceeded or failed expectations. The success of a firm operating along these
lines will depend on its ability to set accurate expectations. But this is an uncertain do-
main, and it is therefore plausible to think that studios often make mistakes.
177 See Emily Nussbaum, Psst, Serena is a Slut. Pass It On., New York (May 30,
2005), online at http://nymag.com/nymetro/arts/books/12058 (visited Nov 24, 2013).
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novels outside of the firm. The team of writers of the subsequent
Gossip Girl books and series did not receive the same ex post de-
rivative rewards-presumably because, as the series became
more formulaic, certainty and observability increased to levels
where more conventional compensation for and monitoring of ef-
fort became increasingly effective.
Furthermore, it is easier to create a Holmstr6m firm when
there is at least partial certainty regarding the team's potential
output. The manager needs to know how much the team could
produce if the team members do not shirk so that the manager
can set an appropriate threshold for reward. As compared to or-
dinary works, it is likely that derivative works have lower levels
of uncertainty. Because the original work already exists, the
manager has some sense of the demand for related works, which
may help establish a baseline for the potential value of the
team's collaboration. Batman Begins informs expectations for
The Dark Knight. Prior entries in the Batman series of films in-
formed expectations for Batman Begins. Even the value of a dif-
ferent medium within a franchise is informative. Sales of an X-
Men comic book series help inform the studio's estimate of the
potential revenues for a "successful" X-Men film.
This can help explain Hollywood's increasing preference for
sequels and remakes over original works. Popular commentary
indicates that Hollywood is unoriginal or afraid of risks. While
we cannot exclude the possibility that Hollywood is simply risk
averse, we are not persuaded by this as a complete explanation.
After all, while films may be increasingly unimaginative, it does
not appear that any such trend is taking place in television,
where shows have become increasingly innovative.178 It could
well be that original films are high-risk, high-reward proposi-
tions while derivative works are low-risk, low-reward proposi-
tions; still, if the two have the same expected value, there should
be no preference for one or the other.
But if it is the case that the Holmstrom firm is better able to
coordinate activity when uncertainty about the outcome is low,
and that making sequels or remakes is the best way to reduce
178 See, for example, Michiko Kakutani, Television That's Worth Dissecting, NY
Times Cl (Dec 4, 2012) (reviewing Alan Sepinwall's book describing a dozen recent TV
series "that have forged a new golden age in TV: bold, innovative shows that have
pushed the boundaries of storytelling, mixed high and low culture, and demonstrated
that the small screen could be an ideal medium for writers and directors eager to create
complex, challenging narratives with 'moral shades of gray"'). Or, better yet, see the car-
ousel scene from Mad Men. Mad Men: The Wheel (AMC Oct 18, 2007).
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uncertainty for films, then we have a plausible explanation for
Hollywood's preference for a seventh version of Batman. The
point is not that the Hollywood firms have an aversion to risk or
creativity. Instead, they have a preference for lowest (relative)
cost production. As firms, their comparative cost advantage is
where there is a mechanism that facilitates firm production. If
the derivative-works right provides such a mechanism, then
firm production will gravitate toward producing derivative films
and films that are more likely to produce valuable derivative
rights. For more original work without derivative rights, the
bigger firms have no comparative advantage over independent
filmmakers. They can do just as well buying those on the market
to distribute after they are produced.
In television, the norm that the dominant product is a se-
ries-with its built in derivative work-may serve the same role
without limiting creativity as much.179 As for the fact that Hol-
lywood's so-called golden age was not driven by such a prefer-
ence, we note casually that the derivative-works right was only
firmly enacted into law in the 1976 Copyright Act,180 which coin-
cides nicely with the 1977 release of the urtext of Hollywood
franchises: Star Wars.181
2. The derivative-works right and the Alchian and Demsetz
firm.
The derivative-works right may also facilitate the formation
of an Alchian and Demsetz firm, although by a somewhat differ-
ent mechanism. Recall that the Alchian and Demsetz manager
specializes in observation. Although it is difficult to precisely
discern whether a given input is contributing to the team's col-
laborative efforts, a manager may, through skill and experience,
be at least partially able to overcome the unobservability con-
straint. When she does so, she can coordinate the team's activi-
ties by allocating and reallocating tasks so as to maximize the
total output.
179 It may be argued that the series format itself limits creativity.
180 Copyright Act, Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (1976), codified as amended at 17
USC § 101 et seq.
181 We do mean this casually. The 1976 Copyright Act only took effect on January 1,
1978. See Copyright Act, Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (1976), codified as amended at
17 USC § 101 et seq. And derivative-works rights were not unknown prior to the Act. See
note 156. Still, the coincidence in timing is sufficiently striking that it provides some in-
triguing grounding for the theories we discuss, and could form the basis for later empiri-
cal work testing these theories.
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The derivative-works doctrine might therefore be thought to
rest on an empirical claim about the learning curve of the cen-
tralized monitor. It is plausible, though of course by no means
certain, that the person who metered the inputs during the pro-
duction of an original work learned something valuable about
those inputs. Perhaps the monitor discovered that one of the in-
puts has a particularly strong command of a regional dialect,
useful for writing dialogue for characters from that region. Or
perhaps the monitor learned that one of the inputs responds
poorly to a common motivational technique. Whatever it is that
the monitor has learned during the production of the first work
may well be put to use in the production of the second. The de-
rivative-works doctrine thus stands on stronger footing if, as
seems plausible, the best person to monitor the production of re-
lated works is likely to be the person who monitored the produc-
tion of the first work.182
Consider in this light the classic case involving Rocky IV.18
Timothy Anderson wrote a treatment describing a potential sto-
ry for a sequel to Rocky III, incorporating the same characters as
the first three films in the series in a new story involving Rocky
fighting a Russian boxer under international spotlights.184 An-
derson met with the studio's president and a member of its
board of directors to discuss the possibility of the studio buying
the rights to the treatment for Rocky 1V.18 Ultimately, their ne-
gotiations went nowhere.186 After Rocky IV was released, Ander-
son sued, contending that it infringed on his treatment.187 The
court rejected his claim, granting summary judgment to the stu-
dio because Anderson's treatment constituted an unauthorized
derivative work and Anderson therefore had no rights to it.188
182 The right to produce derivative works is transferrable. As a result, if someone
else is better placed to fill the manager's role for subsequent works, the manager can al-
ways agree to be bought out. This is also consistent with Alchian and Demsetz's analysis
of the characteristics of a firm. And it responds to the classic Coasean case for allocating
entitlements: where transaction costs are high, we should aim to vest the entitlement in
the highest-value user.
183 See Anderson v Stallone, 1989 WL 206431, *1-4 (CD Cal).
184 See id at *1.
185 See id.
186 See id at *1-2.
187 Anderson, 1989 WL 206431 at *5.
188 Technically, Anderson only lost the rights to those portions of the derivative that
incorporated the original. But because the derivative here was infused with the origi-
nal-all of Rocky IV incorporated the characters and backstory of the previous films-
Anderson was left without a copyright at all. See id at *6-18.
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The conventional view of the derivative-works doctrine sug-
gests that we have a simple lens with which to view this case.
On one hand, maybe we should worry that Sylvester Stallone
wouldn't have written the first film if he wasn't sure he could
appropriate the returns from the sequels. Alternatively, maybe
we want to encourage many Timothy Andersons to write many
versions of Rocky IV, so that we can then choose which one is
best by allocating our entertainment dollars accordingly. If the
first concern outweighs the latter, the derivative-works right is a
good idea; otherwise, it's a bad one. More sophisticated views
might suggest that Anderson could have better spent his limited
creative resources writing treatments for unrelated works that
would add more social value overall by virtue of their differences
from existing works.
We view the case differently. If Anderson v StalloneS9 came
out the right way, it may well have been because the monitor
who oversaw the production of the first three films knew more
about the inputs to those films-actors, screenwriters, cinema-
tographers, directors, crew-than anyone else. She was there-
fore best situated to produce the next film. And because bargain-
ing over intellectual property assets-especially before they are
produced-is difficult,19o we need to worry a great deal about
that initial allocation of the entitlement to produce the sequel.'st
The team-production view of copyright law that we have articu-
lated gives us reason to think that Anderson got it right.
3. The derivative-works right applied to sole-authored
works.
We have thus far been focusing on the ways in which the
team-production theory explains how the derivative-works right
affects the production of joint works. But the team-production
theory may also explain the effect of the derivative-works right
on the production of sole-authored works. Indeed, the team-
production theory may help resolve a vexing recurring question
in copyright law: Is there a coherent distinction between works
whose sale might infringe the distribution right and those that
infringe only the derivative-works right? This question is im-
portant not only at a conceptual level, but also at a practical one.
189 1989 WL 206431 (CD Cal).
190 See Merges, Intellectual Property Rights at *17-19 (cited in note 14).
191 This is a straightforward application of the Coase Theorem. See generally R.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
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The first-sale doctrine provides a defense to infringements of the
distribution right, but not to infringements of the derivative-
works right.192 So if the defendant had actually purchased a copy
of the original work and then sold a modified version of that
copy, her alleged infringement gives rise to liability only if the
modified version constitutes a derivative work.
We propose that derivative works should include only those
works for which the contributions of the original author and
those of the subsequent author constitute "inseparable or inter-
dependent parts of a unitary whole."93 In other words, when the
subsequent work and the original work resemble the contribu-
tions of authors to a joint work, the subsequent work is a deriva-
tive of the original.
Consider, for example, J.R.R. Tolkien's series of books. Tol-
kien was the sole creative input for The Hobbit, The Fellowship
of the Ring, The Two Towers, and The Return of the King. No
team-production problem is apparent in a single author writing
several books.
Now imagine that J.K. Rowling decided to write a sequel to
The Fellowship of the Ring; call it Harry Potter and the Two
Towers. In such a scenario, a team-production problem would
arise because it would be difficult to allocate responsibility for
the value of Harry Potter and the Two Towers between the con-
cepts, storylines, themes, prose, and characters introduced by
Tolkien in The Fellowship of the Ring and those introduced by
Rowling in Harry Potter and the Two Towers. Both Tolkien and
Rowling would be partially responsible for creating the value
embedded in Harry Potter and the Two Towers, but it would be
hard to know how much is attributable to each of the two au-
thors. As this example shows, the team-production theory illu-
minates another role of the derivative-works right: avoiding the
creation of team-production problems that would otherwise arise
over the course of several related works.
An additional benefit of this interpretation can be found
when there is an opportunity for contemporaneous production
and negotiation. In the example of Tolkien and Rowling, the law
may prevent team-production problems for sequential creation.
If Tolkien and Rowling were contemporaries, the rule would
have a major impact on their relationship. Suppose Rowling has
192 See 17 USC § 109.
193 17 USC § 101.
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some valuable creative ideas that build on Tolkien's work. If
Rowling can wait until Tolkien finishes his original work to cre-
ate her derivative product on her own, then she has less incen-
tive to work with Tolkien. But we might expect that the value of
their team production would be greater if they actually worked
in a team. Therefore Rowling is encouraged to approach Tolkien
to collaborate on the derivative work (or perhaps on the original
work).194 In this way, the law can encourage collaboration be-
tween the creative inputs, which we might think is superior to
sequential independent adaptation. On the other hand, where
the value of sequential adaptation is easily allocated, no team-
production problems arise.
This view can help resolve the conflict in the A.R. T. cases, in
which the Seventh9s and Ninth Circuits196 reached opposite re-
sults facing nearly identical facts. The defendant in these cases
bought small lithographs and prints created by the plaintiff art-
ists.197 The defendant then mounted those lithographs and prints
onto ceramic tiles, which the defendant then sold.198 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the defendant infringed the derivative-
works right;199 the Seventh Circuit concluded that the defendant
would have infringed only the distribution right, and therefore
was shielded by the first-sale doctrine.200 Each court reached its
result after wringing meaning from sparse statutory text.201
A more sensible analysis might ask whether the defendant's
activity gave rise to problems of observability, verifiability, or
uncertainty, or difficulty allocating between defendant's and
plaintiffs contributions. It seems that here, no such problems
arise. A contract might easily be written requiring that a litho-
graph be mounted on a ceramic tile and payment conditioned on
194 In this scenario, Rowling will be vulnerable to appropriation of her idea by Tol-
kien, who owns the derivative-works right that encompasses her proposal. Although
trust and reputation might reduce Rowling's vulnerability, these considerations are be-
yond the scope of the present work.
195 See Lee v A.R.T. Co, 125 F3d 580 (7th Cir 1997).
196 See Mirage Editions, Inc v Albuquerque A.R.T. Co, 856 F2d 1341 (9th Cir 1988).
197 See Lee, 125 F3d at 580; Mirage Editions, 856 F2d at 1342.
198 See Lee, 125 F3d at 580; Mirage Editions, 856 F2d at 1342.
199 See Mirage, 856 F2d at 1344.
200 See Lee, 125 F3d at 582-83.
201 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that mounting on a ceramic tile "recast or trans-
formed" the work. Mirage, 856 F2d at 1344. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the de-
fendant's activities did not constitute "art reproductions" and that including the ceramic
tile within "recast" or "transformed" language would render impermissible unauthorized
framing of art and similar activity commonly performed by art buyers. Lee, 125 F3d at
582.
1738 [80:1683
Copyright in Teams
successful performance of that relatively straightforward task.
For this reason, we think the Seventh Circuit's result the better
one.
CONCLUSION
Paper Lantern Lit, a boutique competitor of Alloy,202 doesn't
buy any idea pitches on the market: "[W]e prefer to focus on spe-
cially-crafted in-house 'sparks' that we've spent months cultivat-
ing. We don't just come up with ideas on the fly-we take the
time necessary to analyze the concept, build a solid plot, and as-
sess its viability in the market."203
Paper Lantern Lit prides itself on its "spark" develop-
ment.204 The sparks are shared at team meetings. No one "owns"
the sparks in a property sense. The norm governing the rights in
an idea is that any idea shared at the meeting belongs to Paper
Lantern Lit. Employees are free to pursue their own projects
based on ideas not discussed at the meeting. The key to making
this system work is being able to differentiate similar ideas and
knowing what makes an idea new. Romeo and Juliet meets the
Upper East Side is not a new idea; it's just a setting choice for a
formula plot. There needs to be something more specific for the
firm to find the contribution valuable and for it to invoke the
norm of firm ownership.205
202 Alloy is arguably the biggest player in the book-packaging industry. But new-
comers like Paper Lantern Lit have started to spring up in the last decade. Paper Lan-
tern Lit is a boutique literary incubator aiming largely at the same audience (though
with arguably different content goals). See Hillyer Interview (cited in note 6) (cofounder
of Paper Lantern Lit); Danielle Sacks, Paper Lantern Lit Matches Undiscovered Writers
with Publishers to Create Mass Market Hits (Fast Company Oct 15, 2012), online at
www.fastcompany.com/3001757/paper-latern-lit-matches-undiscovered-writers-
publishers-create-mass-market-hits (visited June 9, 2013). A more controversial recent
entrant focusing on a broader audience is Full Fathom Five, founded by James Frey (in-
famous for the fictional nonfiction piece A Million Little Pieces). See Suzanne Mozes,
James Frey's Fiction Factory (New York Magazine Online Nov 12, 2010), online at
http://nymag.com/arts/books/features/69474 (visited Nov 24, 2013) (describing the pro-
duction process at Full Fathom Five). One personal tutoring website advises students
not to read Full Fathom Five novels: "While we won't make the blanket statement that
all book packagers are slowly killing literature, it's pretty safe to say that Full Fathom
Five is." Read This Not That: Full Fathom Five (C2 Education Feb 23, 2012), online at
www.c2educate.com/read-this-not-that/read-this-not-that-full-fathom-five (visited June
9, 2013).
203 WTF (Paper Lantern Lit), online at http://www.paperlanternlit.com/wtf (visited
Nov 24, 2013). Alloy follows a similar model.
204 See id.
205 See Hillyer Interview (cited in note 6). Alloy has a similar process for idea crea-
tion: "Ideas are generated in weekly development meetings and are fleshed out into a
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But even when the norm is invoked, it is difficult to enforce.
Whether team members are volunteering only their disposable
ideas (while saving the best for themselves) or whether they are
using the ideas of others at the meetings to derive ideas for their
own personal works may be difficult to observe and almost im-
possible to verify. But the firm's managers are experienced mon-
itors206 and seem to think there is a sufficient level of certainty
to facilitate the penalty and reward system through payments,
creative credits, and derivative rights. The same is true of Al-
loy.207 In the end, the more Paper Lantern Lit and Alloy can
monitor or use tools like derivative-works rights to solve moral-
hazard problems, the more cost effective their business models
will be-and the more audiences will be consuming books like
Gossip Girl, Vampire Diaries, and The Fury.
In this Article, we have explored the factors that drive a
firm like Paper Lantern Lit to create its own sparks at team
meetings as well as the obstacles that may make that difficult.
In turn, we have looked at how the law of copyright can affect
those factors. The impact may change the way Paper Lantern
Lit does business; or it may allow it to provide more creative
products; or if it is dramatic, it may shift production to different
organizational forms (and different creative content) altogether.
Other changes may occur when technology shifts. Indeed,
the emerging presence of these and other firms we have dis-
cussed may be explainable by the development of both legal doc-
trine and monitoring expertise. Technological advances such as
the monitoring of creative brain activity could encourage collab-
orative creative firms and again potentially change the nature of
the art and science we consume. The law's response to these de-
velopments will raise complicated normative questions about the
value of various types of creative production.
These factors will differ across industries. For example, in
some creative industries brain activity may be more difficult to
monitor or the ability to capture derivative rights might be low.
short summary by an editor. ... [A writer is assigned and the] writer then hashes out a
plot with [executive VP Josh] Bank, one or two other editors, and Sara Shandler, Alloy's
editorial director." Mead, The Gossip Mill, The New Yorker at 62 (cited in note 5).
206 Paper Lantern Lit was founded and is managed by a duo made up of a best-
selling author with editorial experience and a veteran editor who is also a published au-
thor. See The Architects (Paper Lantern Lit), online at http://www.paperlanternlit.com
/architects (visited Nov 24, 2013).
207 See text accompanying notes 176-78 (discussing the differing derivative-rights
rewards for the initial and subsequent authors of the novels in the Gossip Girl series).
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Those industries will be organized differently. This may help
explain, for example, norms and contracts that operate different-
ly in the restaurant industry. The intellectual property rights in
creative menu items20s are much weaker than they are for books,
television, and film. Because restaurant teams cannot use the
intellectual property mechanisms we have identified here to fa-
cilitate their organizational structures, we should expect con-
tracts in the restaurant industry to allow easy exit from the re-
lationship, and rewards and penalties to take other forms like
reputation.
Lawyers and scholars must consider these differences along
with the traditional factors and doctrines that dictate our intel-
lectual property law. The rights in any creative work-whether
a menu item or a movie-should be determined as much by the
respective effect those rights have on the organization of collabo-
rative creativity in the restaurant and film industries as by tra-
ditional notions of incentives in intellectual property theory.
208 See generally Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces:
Should Thomas Keller's Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J
1121 (2007).
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